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Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality:

Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions
Susan W. Brenner*

He who profits by a crime
commits it.'
I. INTRODUCTION

The Pinkerton doctrine is a judicially-created rule that makes each
member of a conspiracy liable for crimes that other members commit to
further their joint criminal design.2 It is generally accepted in federal criminal
law, was rejected by the drafters of the Model Penal Code and enjoys a mixed
reaction among the states. This Article analyzes the rationale for coconspirator liability and considers whether it can be enforced under the federal
3
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, known as "RICO."
Section II(A) outlines the law of complicity, a related doctrine that imposes
liability for crimes committed by another under circumstances different from
those involved in Pinkerton. Section II(B) traces the origins of the Pinkerton
rule and analyzes the premises of Pinkerton liability. The analysis reveals that
the Pinkerton doctrine shares an empirical rationale with complicity, so that
they are distinct varieties of a single phenomenon which is denominated as
"affiliative liability." Section II(C) summarizes RICO law and practice, and
Section III considers whether Pinkerton liability should apply in RICO cases.
Section IV offers a brief summary and conclusion.
II. CONTEXT: COMPLICITY, PINKERTON AND RICO

Whenever persons join for the purpose of executing a common criminal
purpose, each one is the agent of the other as to all acts in furtherance
4
thereof, and each is criminally liable for such acts of the others.

* Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law

1. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 3 (D. Shrager & E. Frost ed. 1986) (quoting SENECA,
Medea).
2. See Developments in the Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920,
994-1000 (1959) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Note, VicariousLiabilityfor
Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators,56 YALE L.J. 371 (1947).
3. See infra section II(C) of this Article, pp.
4. W. CLARK, HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 99 (2d ed. 1902).
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Complicity is defined as "participation in guilt."15 In the law of crimes,
it is a principle that allows one who did not commit an offense to be held
6
liable for the conduct of an associate who physically perpetrated the crime.
This section outlines the basic tenets of complicity as an introduction to the
Pinkerton doctrine, because it is generally regarded as a rule of complicity.
A. Complicity
Common law divided participants in crime into principals and accessories,7 and then split these categories into subdivisions, each of which denoted
a particular degree of participation in criminal activity.' "Principals" became
"principals in the first degree" and "principals in the second degree." 9 A
principal in the first degree was someone who physically committed a criminal
act.'" A principal in the second degree was present when a criminal act was
committed and "aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged" its commis-

sion." The distinction between principals was a matter of form rather than
substance, because their liability was the same. 12 "Accessories" were those

5. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
547 (2d ed. unabr. 1955).
6. See, e.g., J. DRESSLER,

UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 409 (1987); R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 766-67 (3d ed. 1982).
7. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 722; see also 1 F.
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 309-61 (11th ed. 1912); G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAw 346-427 (2d ed. 1961). The system described above applied to
felonies; misdemeanors were governed by a similar but distinct system of classification. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 569 (2d ed. 1986); R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 722.
'8. See, e.g., F. WHARTON, supra note 7, at 311-58.
9. See id. at 311-35; W. LAFAVE & A. SCoTr, supra note 7, at 569-71; G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 346-49, 353-60.
10. See F. WHARTON, supra note 7, at 311 ("A principal in the first degree...
is the actual perpetrator of the criminal act"); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra
note 7, at 569; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 346-47.
11. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 738. Accord W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 7, at 571; F. WHARTON, supra note 7, at 314-15; see also W.
CLARK, supra note 4, at 102-03 (second degree principal "aid[s] or abet[s]" the
criminal act). "Presence" encompassed actual and "constructive" presence. "Constructive presence" meant one was working with the perpetrator and in a position to assist
him in successfully committing the offense. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
6, at 741; see also 1 J. BISHOP, NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 399-400
(8th ed. 1892); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 31
(1962); W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 102-03; F. WHARTON, supra note 7, at 322-23.
12. Accord 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at 396; see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
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whose involvement was not sufficient to make them principals. 3 Early
common law divided accessories into accessories "before the fact," "at the

fact," and "after the fact," 4 but "accessory at the fact" was later reclassified
as a principal. 5 An accessory "before the fact" was not present when a crime
was committed but had "procured, counseled, commanded, or abetted the
principal" in committing it.'6 The accessory was liable for the probable

consequences of his "counsel or command" to commit a crime but not for acts
that were "essentially different from that counseled or commanded." 7 An
accessory "after the fact" helped a "known felon."' Common law regarded
post-offense assistance as participation in the original crime and punished it
as such.' 9

Though common law distinguished degrees of participation, it imposed
the same penalties upon principals in the first and second degree, and
accessories "suffer[ed] the same punishment as their principals." 20 The
distinctions were important procedurally but irrelevant to culpability and
punishment.2 '
American criminal law has replaced these categories with a paradigm
from the Model Penal Code ("Code"). 22 Section 2.06 of the Code, provides

supra note 6, at 738 ("guilt is exactly the same"). It was procedurally relevant in some
jurisdictions. See W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 108.
13. See 1 J.BISHOP, supra note 11, at 405 (accessory "participates in a felony too
remotely to be deemed a principal"); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 32 (accessory
is "not the chief actor in the offence.., but is some way concerned ...either before
or after the fact committed") (author's emphasis).
14. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 722.
15. Id. at 727; 12 J. STEPHEN, A. HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND
230 (1883).
16. W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 109 (footnotes omitted). See also 1 J. BISHOP,

supra note 11, at 410; F. WHARTON, supra note 7, at 336.
17. W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 110 (footnote omitted). Accord F. WHARTON,
supra note 7, at 343.
18. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 34. Accord W. CLARK, supra note 4,
at 113; 12 J. STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 231.
19. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 409-10. See also 12 J. STEPHEN, supra note
15, at 233.
20. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 35 (footnote omitted). See also W.
CLARK, supra note 4, at 115; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 729.
21. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 35-36; see also R. PERKINS
& R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 730, 735.
22. The old terms emerge on occasion. See J. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at 411.
The Code was created as a model to be used in revising criminal codes based on
common law. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 7, at 2-6.
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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that one is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of a person "for

which he is legally accountable."' To be accountable for another's conduct,
one must cause an innocent party to engage in that conduct, 2S or be made
otherwise responsible for it.26 The latter alternative authorizes "vicarious
liability,"'2 while another provision introduces the concept of "accomplice."'
An accomplice solicits another to commit a crime, aids or attempts to aid
another in planning or committing it, or has a legal duty to prevent its
commission and fails to do so. 29 One is an accomplice if a statute defines her
conduct as such 3° or if she participates in causing a result that is an element
of an offense.3 ' A victim is not an accomplice, nor is one whose conduct was
an "inevitable incident" of an offense. 2
The Code formulation differs from common law by eliminating the
distinction between principals and accessories and making all participants in
an offense principals.33 The Code also rejects the common law rule that a
participant is liable for the "natural and probable consequences of her acts."
Under this rule one is liable for consequences that "might reasonably be
expected to result from" a crime as well as for the crime itself.34 Under the
35
Code, one is not liable for conduct that is outside one's "criminal purpose.
Its drafters believed an accomplice should be liable only for "the purposes that
he shares. 3 6 They felt that using probabilities was inconsistent with the
premise that criminal liability is reserved for those who act with heightened
37
culpability.

24. Id. § 2.06(1). Conduct that made one an accessory after the fact is treated
separately. See id. § 2.06 commentary at 298-99. Federal criminal law retains the
concept of accessory after the fact. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1988) (accessory after the fact
knows an offense has been committed and "assists the offender.., to... prevent his
apprehension").
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 300 (1985).
26. Id. § 2.06(2).
27. Id. § 2.06 commentary at 305. See also infra section II(B)(2) of this Article,

PP.
28. MODELPENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 306 (1985) (chosen because it had
"no special meanings under either common law or modem legislation").
29. Id. § 2.06(3).
30. Id. § 2.06(3)(b).

31. Id. § 2.06(4).
32. Id. § 2.06(6).
33. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 767.
34. Id. at 745 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at 37) (footnote omitted).
See also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 311 (1985) (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 312.
37. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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Complicity in federal criminal law is governed by 18 U.S.C. section 2,38
which does not follow the Code;39 it adopts general principles of common law
complicity while rejecting the accessory-principal distinction. 40 This statute
does not define a distinct offense but merely identifies circumstances under
which the aider and abettor of an offense can be punished as a principal in its
commission."

B. PinkertonLiability
Pinkertonv. United States42 was a tax case-Walter and Daniel Pinkerton
were accused of evading liquor taxes.43 Each was charged with ten substan-

tive counts and conspiracy.' Both were convicted of conspiracy; Walter was
convicted of nine substantive counts and Daniel of six.45 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because that decision
conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Sall.'
The conflict arose from an instruction that told the Pinkerton jury it could
convict the brothers of the substantive offenses if it found that these offenses
were committed to advance a conspiracy between them! 7 Daniel challenged

38. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
39. One is liable as a principal if he (a) "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces
or procures" the commission of an offense, or (b) "willfully causes an act to be done
which if directly performed by him... would be an offense." 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
This statute is based upon 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1988), which was added to the federal
criminal code in 1909. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (abolishes
distinction between principal and accessory); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827,
831 (6th Cir. 1942) (uses "almost the identical language by which the common law
defined aiders, abettors, and accessories"); accordColosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d
165 (10th Cir. 1952). Aiders and abettors are punished as principals under section 2
but are subject to less severe punishment under the Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 242.4 (1985).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 871 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1989); Kegler,
724 F.2d at 190; United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
42. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
43. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("unlawful possession, transportation, and
dealing in whiskey"); id. at 641 n.1 (violating Internal Revenue Code § 3321). Walter
and Daniel were brothers who lived on Daniel's farm: "[B]oth... [sold] whiskey and
[were] arrested and convicted many times for violating the liquor laws." Owens v.
United States, 151 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1985). See alsoPinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.

44. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 642. See United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940).
47. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645 n.6. Daniel's liability was not considered
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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this instruction by relying upon Sall.48 The Sall court had held that participation in a conspiracy could not support liability for substantive crimes even
though the crimes were committed to "further" the conspiracy. 9 It held that
substantive liability could be imposed only upon "evidence of direct
participation" in the substantive offenses or evidence from which "participation
might fairly be inferred."50 Daniel argued that his conviction on the
substantive counts was improper under Sall because there was no evidence
substantive offenses.5 1

that he had participated in committing the
The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas
found that the Pinkertons had joined in a conspiracy from which Daniel made
no effort to extricate himself.52 Douglas cited his opinion in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.53 for the proposition that a "conspiracy is a partnership in crime,"5 4 and cited Hyde v. United States s as establishing that once
one joins a conspiracy, he is a member and an offender until and unless "he

under the complicity statute. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1944)).
48. Walter could not raise this issue because it was clear that he had committed
the substantive offenses. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645 n.5. Daniel argued that no
evidence showed that he had participated in the offenses; indeed, he was in jail when
Walter committed some of them. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 646. Harry Sall and his co-defendants were charged with conspiring to

evade federal liquor taxes and seven counts of the substantive offense at issue in
Pinkerton. Sall, 116 F.2d at 746. Government evidence showed that Sall leased
premises on which agents found stills and had bought and operated a truck used by the
operation. Id. at 746-47. Sail argued that this was insufficient to prove his
involvement. Id. at 747. The government maintained that having become an
accomplice in a still, Sall was liable for all crimes committed in furtherance of that
enterprise regardless of "personal participation in or even knowledge of the precise
details." Id. The court held that while the government did not have to show Sall was
present when the crimes were committed, it had to prove that he "aid[ed], abet[ted],
counsel[ed], command[ed], induce[d] or procure[d]" concealment of alcohol. Id. "It
was not sufficient ...to prove that he was a member of the conspiracy ... and that
...those... crimes were committed by other conspirators." Id. (Holding otherwise

would allow prosecutors "to convict a conspirator of every.., offense committed by
any other member of the group even though he had no part in it or even knowledge
of it." Id. at 747-48). The federal conspiracy statute then made it an offense to
conspire to commit a federal offense or defraud the United States and to commit any
act to "effect the unlawful object of the conspiracy." Id. at 747.
50. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646. See also Sail, 116 F.2d at 747-48.
51. Pinkerton,328 U.S. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also supra note 47;
Note, supra note 2, at 372 n.13.
52. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 642, 646.

53. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
54. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644 (citing Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 253.)
55. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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does some act to disavow or defeat" its criminal purpose." Since Daniel had
Walter, he remained an offender
done nothing to abandon his conspiracy with
57
"'through every moment of its existence.'
Douglas then enunciated what has become known as the Pinkerton
doctrine: Because members of a conspiracy are "partners in crime," they are
liable for each other's acts as long as those acts are taken to further the

conspiracy's criminal purposes.

Because of this, Daniel Pinkerton was liable

for offenses that were committed solely by his brother.5 9 Justice Rutledge
dissented because he was concerned about the doctrine's potential for abuse,, °
and because he contended that it was not based upon existing law.61
1. Sources of the Doctrine
The best indicator of whether Pinkerton applied extant law is the
authority cited as supporting the holding. In enunciating the doctrine, Justice
Douglas relied upon United States v. Kissel,62 and five circuit court decisions. 63

56. Pinkerton,328 U.S. at 646 (quoting Hyde, 225 U.S. at 369).
57. Id. (quoting Hyde, 225 U.S. at 369). See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
58. [S]o long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act
for each other in carrying it forward .... Each conspirator
instigated the commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement
contemplated precisely what was done. It was formed for the
purpose. The act done was in execution of the enterprise ....
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 646-47 (citations omitted). This is not true if a substantive
offense "was not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within" its
scope or was "a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." Id. at 64748..
59. Id. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 2, at 372 n.13.
60. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 650 (possible abuse of "the almost unlimited ...
vicarious responsibility for others' acts which follows once agreement is shown").
61. Id. at 651. For Justice Rutledge's views on this issue, see infra notes 102-03
and accompanying text.
62. 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
63. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. Earlier in the opinion Douglas cited SoconyVacuum for the proposition that members of a conspiracy are "partners in crime." Id.
at 644 (quoting Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 253). The citation referenced the
statement that "a conspiracy is a partnership in crime; and an 'overt act of one partner
may be the act of all."' Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 253-54 (quoting Kissel, 218 U.S.
at 608). The Socony-Vacuum statement was part of a finding that an overt act had
been committed in the district of the trial court. Id. at 252-53. The circuit court
decisions by
are University
cited in thisofpassage
ofSchool
the Pinkerton
Published
Missouri
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Kissel was a prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' The
defendants argued that it was time-barred on the theory that conspiracy is a
completed offense once an agreement is made, so the applicable period of
limitations begins to run at that moment." Writing for the Court, Justice
Holmes disagreed, and in so doing distinguished a conspiracy from the
agreement that brings it into existence:" "A conspiracy is ... the result of
the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership, although
constituted by a contract, is not the contract but is a result of it ....
conspiracy is a partnershipin criminalpurposes."'67

A

Because Holmes cited no authority for the last statement, 63 and because
the imputation of co-conspirator liability was not at issue, it seems the
premises of the Pinkerton doctrine must9 appear in the circuit court decisions
Justice Douglas cited in enunciating it.

A scheme to use the mails to defraud, which is joined in by more than one
person, is a conspiracy. Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 199-200.
Yet all members are responsible, though only one did the mailing. Cochran
v. United States, supra;Mackett v. United States, 90 F.2d 462, 464; Baker
v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 540; Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351,

359. The governing principle is the same when the substantive offense is
committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project.
Johnson v. United States, 62 F. 2d 32, 34.
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. Seeking the premise of Pinkertonliability in the authority
cited in the opinion may be an exercise in futility. A recent analysis of Justice
Douglas' tenure on the Court argues that he paid little attention to the "doctrinal
dimensions of judging ... what counted were the results." White, The Anti-Judge:
William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 46
(1988). The article suggests that this tendency was exacerbated in the opinions he
wrote between 1939 and 1949. See id. at 47 n.159 (analysis in a sample of opinions

from this period was "sketchy" and "assertive").
64. Kisse4 218 U.S. at 605-06 ("unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade in
refined sugar among the ... states").
65. Id. at 607.

66. Holmes rejected the defendant's argument because he concluded that a
conspiracy may require a period of continuous existence to achieve its goals. Id. at

608.
67. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added). Holmes' description was later criticized.

See, e.g, Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 n.4 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("Justice Holmes supplied an oversimplified working definition" of
conspiracy).
68. See Kisse 218 U.S. at 608.

69. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647. The decisions are Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d
351 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1944); Baker v. United States, 115
F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1940); Mackett v. United States, 90
F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1937); Johnson v. United States, 62 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1932);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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Four of these decisions-Cochran,70 Mackett,7' Baker 72 and
Bluer--issued in mail fraud prosecutions. 74 Defendants were convicted and
appealed, arguing that they had not "caused" the mail to be used in perpetrating a scheme to defraud. 75 In each case, the court found that the defendant(s)
had caused the mailings. 76 While the opinions feature agency terminology,
they did not impose Pinkerton liability: 77 Cochran used an aiding and
abetting rationale, 78 while the others relied upon proximate causation.
A law note from this era reported that courts found causation in these
cases under either of two theories-"fictitious agency" and "proximate

causation."8

But if one examines the cases cited as applying each, it

becomes apparent that they all used a proximate cause analysis. 81 United

Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1930). See also supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
70. Cochran, 41 F.2d at 195-96.
71. Mackett, 90 F.2d at 463.
72. Baker, 115 F.2d at 536.

73. Blue, 138 F.2d at 353.
74. Then, as now, the statute made it an offense to use the mails to execute a
"scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses... or promises." 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
75. Blue, 138 F.2d at 358-59; Baker, 115 F.2d at 540; Mackett, 90 F.2d at 463-64;

Cochran, 41 F.2d at 197.
76. Blue, 138 F.2d at 358-59; Baker, 115 F.2d at 540; Mackett, 90 F.2d at 46364; Cochran, 41 F.2d at 197.
77. See Baker, 115 F.2d at 540; Cochran, 41 F.2d at 199-200. See generally
Mackett, 90 F.2d at 464 (all "partners" in the scheme "were responsible for the use of
the mail").
78. Cochran, 41 F.2d at 204-05. See also id. at 197 (defendant liable as a
principal if he aided and abetted the offense).
79. This rationale is apparent in this excerpt from Blue:
Where a party ... presents a check to a branch bank... and it can be

reasonably foreseen that the check will pass through the mails to be paid
the party ... 'causes' the mails to be used ...and where those
connected with a scheme ... must have anticipated ... that the mails
...

would be used in its execution... the use of the mails by one or more...
becomes the act of each ....

Blue, 138 F.2d at 359 (citations omitted). Accord Baker, 115 F.2d at 540; Mackett,
90 F.2d at 464 ("Hanecy placed the.., check.., with the... Bank... and by so
doing the bank became his agent and he became responsible for any use of the mail
which the bank employed in making collection....").
80. Recent Case, 21 MINN. L. REv. 342, 343 (1937).

81. The Note implicitly recognizes this in its conclusion. See id. at 343-44
each). School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
(foreseeability
analysis under
Published by University
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States v. Kenofskey2 illustrates the truth of this statement, as well as how this
confusion arose.
An insurance investigator, Kenofskey, supplied proof of the deaths of
insureds to a supervisor, who mailed the information to a home office. 3
When Kenofskey filed a false claim, his supervisor sent it in, unaware it was
fraudulent.' Kenofskey knew the claim would be sent through the mails, but
did not actually mail it.' 5 He was indicted for mail fraud but the court6
dismissed the charge and found that Kenofskey had not "caused" the mailing.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "causation" meant "bringing about"
and that Kenofskey brought about the mailing by calculating "the effect of
giving the false proofs to his superior."" The Court then noted that the
superintendent "became Kenofskey's agent ... the means by which he"
committed the offense.8
This statement seems unnecessary because the holding is based upon
proximate causation. 89 It was prompted by a comment from the trial court, 9
and illustrates how these courts juxtaposed agency and proximate cause
82. 243 U.S. 440 (1917).
83. Id. at 441.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 442 ("The defendant did not mail the letter, and the local superintendent
...was not his agent .... ).
87. Id. at 443 ("the effect followed, demonstrating the efficacy of his selection of
means").
88. Id. (citing Demolli v. United States, 144 F. 363 (8th Cir. 1906) (used
proximate cause)). See Demolli, 144 F. at 365.
89. See Kenofskey, 243 U.S. at 441. Under this theory, a defendant is liable if
he sets forces in motion that cause the mails to be used in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud; causation exists even when the mailings are undertaken by persons who are
not aware of their contribution to the fraudulent scheme. See, e.g., United States v.
Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1989) (causation exists when innocent third person
sends mailings that further scheme to defraud if use of mails would foreseeably follow
in ordinary course of business); United States v. Leyden, 842 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th
Cir. 1988) (causation exists if there was a scheme to defraud, it was foreseeable the
mails would be used and they were used "for the purpose" of carrying out the scheme;
defendant need not personally use the mails, and it is sufficient that use by others was
foreseeable); United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986) (defendant
"causes" mailing when he does an act knowing that use of mails will follow in
ordinary course of business or where use can reasonably be foreseen even though not
actually intended); United States v. Contenti, 735 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1984) (same).
Kenofskey "caused" the use of the mails, therefore, when he submitted a false claim,
knowing that his supervisor would mail it to the home office. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. at
441.
90. See Kenofskey, 243 U.S. at 442.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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terminology in this context. When decisions speak of causation due to the
operation of an "agent," they do not use this term to denote a formal agency
relationship but, instead, use it to indicate that a defendant set certain forces
in motion and thereby assumed responsibility for the foreseeable consequences
of those forces.9' This is why four of the decisions Justice Douglas cited in
Pinkerton used agency terminology to analyze causation in actions under the
federal mail fraud statute. 92
These decisions provide one part of the Pinkerton rationale, a theory of

causation the consequences of which are explored in the section immediately
below. Before proceeding with that discussion, however, it is necessary to
consider the contribution made by the last decision Justice Douglas cited-Johnson v. United States.93

The Johnson defendants were convicted of conspiracy and three
substantive offenses and appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence. 94 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.95 Its analysis of the conspiracy
count resembles the analysis in Pinkerton,96 but its discussion of the
substantive offenses is more detailed. 97 This comment illustrates the tenor of
that discussion: "[t]he ... parties were associated together for the illegal
purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and any act done ... to
accomplish that purpose was the act of all.""8 The court upheld liability for
the substantive offenses on the premise that would be rejected in UnitedStates

91. See, e.g., Shea v. United States, 251 F. 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
581 (1918); Recent Case, supra note 80, at 343 (if defendant sets "in motion an
agency, and it is foreseeable that the natural and probable result of that agency will be
the use of the mails, then the defendant has 'caused' the use of the mails") (citing
Demolli, 144 F. at 363); see also 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at 392 ("One is
responsible for what of wrong flows directly from his corrupt intention .... If he set
in motion the physical power of another, he is liable for its result.").
92. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
93. 62 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1932). See supra note 69.
94. Johnson, 62 F.2d at 33. The first count of the indictment charged a conspiracy
to violate "prohibition laws;" the other three counts charged substantive offenses. Id.
95. Id. at 35.
96. Id. at 34 ("at no time did appellants withdraw from the unlawful agreement
...and they therefore remained liable for the acts of their coconspirators"). See supra
notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Johnson and Stickels were former prohibition
agents who conspired with others to manufacture illegal liquor. Johnson, 62 F.2d at
33.
97. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text, for the Pinkerton analysis of
this issue.
98. Johnson,
62 F.2d
at 34. School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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v. Sail,99 i.e., that their membership in the conspiracy made the defendants
liable as aiders and abettors of the substantive offenses. °°
It seems, therefore, that Justice Douglas based the Pinkerton doctrine on
two sources-a rule of proximate causation and a rule of complicity among
co-conspirators.'0 ' In dissenting, Justice Rutledge contended that the

99. 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940).
100. Johnson, 62 F.2d at 35. The court relied upon 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1930) in
upholding liability on these counts. Id. at 34. See also Sail, 116 F.2d at 745. In Sail,
the state argued that Johnson supported liability for the substantive counts at issue in
that prosecution. Id. at 748. See supra notes 46-47. The Sall court distinguished
Johnson on the basis that while the evidence in that case was sufficient to establish the
defendants' participation in the commission of the substantive offenses, the evidence
against Harry Sall was not sufficient for this purpose. Id.
101. These rules are distinct, and while the same result can ensue under either,
it need not. Two hypotheticals illustrate the differences between them:
Hypothetical #1: The perpetrator "causes" an item to be mailed in furtherance
of a scheme to defraud by supplying it to an innocent party; the perpetrator knows the
latter will send it through the mails. The rule of complicity among conspirators does
not apply because there is no conspiracy between the perpetrator and the party who
actually uses the mails. The perpetrator will be convicted because he proximately
caused the mails to be used in furthering an unlawful scheme to defraud. Here, the
innocent party was merely the means by which he completed his crime.
Hypothetical#2: A and B conspire to distill and sell illegal liquor. A is a police
officer whose role is to ignore B's distilling and selling the liquor. They are
discovered and each is charged with conspiracy to violate the liquor laws and
substantive violations of those laws. Under Johnson, A is liable for the latter as well
as for the conspiracy, even though he was not present when B committed the acts that
gave rise to these charges and had no specific knowledge of their commission. A is
liable because by joining the conspiracy and performing the role assigned to him, he
aided and abetted B in committing these offenses. His liability for the substantive
offenses vested when he joined the conspiracy, as it is not necessary that he have
performed any other act to advance the purposes of the conspiracy. Under either
scenario, he is subject to the same liability and the same punishment as the person who
physically executed the criminal acts-B, in this instance.
The effects of the two can be more difficult to distinguish, as in the following
hypothetical based upon the facts in Hume v. United States, 118 F. 689 (5th Cir.
1902), cert. denied, 189 U.S. 510 (1903). A and B enter into a scheme to defraud
individuals by persuading them to invest in worthless securities. A serves as the "front
man," manning an office and making personal contacts with investors and would-be
investors; B has a brochure soliciting investments printed and mailed to a large number
of persons. Their scheme is discovered and a prosecutor charges each with multiple
counts of mail fraud. A challenges these charges, arguing that he was not directly
involved in using the mails.
Some courts have rejected such challenges by holding that a scheme to defraud
is but a conspiracy under another name, so liability is proper under the co-conspirator
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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majority's use of the latter ignored a basic distinction between substantive
offenses, "aiding, abetting or counseling another to commit them," and
conspiracy.' °2 He also maintained that the doctrine abrogated a fundamental

complicity rule. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 237 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916);
Blanton v. United States, 213 F. 320 (8th Cir. 1914). Others have upheld charges on
the premise that the defendant "caused" the mails to be used by joining a scheme to
defraud, though a scenario such as this lacks the instrumental character of the conduct
at issue in the first hypothetical given above. See, e.g., Burton v. United States, 142
F. 57 (8th Cir. 1906). Others have found that the defendant aided and abetted the
mailings and thereby became liable as an accomplice, which supports the imposition
of liability as a principal under the federal complicity statute. See, e.g., Hume, 118 F.
at 689 ("where several acts constitute together one crime, if each is separately
performed by a different individual in the absence of the rest, all are principals as to
the whole.") (citations omitted). For the rationale of this result, See infra pp. 964-66.
Even after Pinkerton,there has been confusion as to whether merely joining a scheme
to defraud, or a conspiracy, is sufficient to trigger accomplice liability or whether it
is necessary that a defendant also commit an act designed to further the affairs of the
criminal venture. For a discussion of this issue, see infra pp. 973-74.
In Pinkerton,Justice Douglas also cited a common law rule under which overt
acts of one member of a conspiracy were attributed to all members. Pinkerton, 328
U.S. at 647 ("the overt act of one partner in crime is attributable to all"). He has been
criticized for this: the overt act "is not attributed to each defendant ...to hold him
responsible for its effects, but is rather meant to show something concerning the
grouping as a whole-either that [it] existed, or that it had reached a stage of
development dangerous to society." Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 998
(footnotes omitted). See also May, Pinkerton v. United States Revisited: A Defense
ofAccomplice Liability, 8 NOVA L.J. 21, 35 (1983) ("To the extent that Douglas relied
upon the overt act rule, the opinion is flawed."). Because this aspect of the holding
is questionable, it is not considered in the discussion above.
102. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 649 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
"The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding [and] abetting is... advising
or assisting another ... that of substantive crime, going a step beyond ...to
completion of the offense." Id. at 649. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440,451 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Sall, 116 F.2d at 747-48 ("To hold otherwise
would ...ignore the difference ...between ...conspiracy and the substantive
crimes which may result from it ....).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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principle of criminal law, namely, that guilt is "personal, not vicarious.

03

The merits of these contentions are considered in the next section.

2. Rationale: Mediate Causation
Pinkerton is a discomforting doctrine because it is not intuitively obvious
why members of a conspiracy should be liable for crimes committed by their
fellows. Furthermore, the opinion's cursory discussion of the issue has
certainly contributed to the doctrine's being regarded as problematic and
inconsistent with traditional principles of criminal liability."' While other

103. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 651:
The Court's theory seems to be that Daniel and Walter became general
partners in crime by virtue of their agreement and because of that
agreement ...Daniel became criminally responsible as a principal for
everything Walter did... in the nature of a criminal offense of the general

sort the agreement contemplated, so long as there was not clear evidence
that Daniel had withdrawn from or revoked the agreement.... [T]he result
is a vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the
vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a co-partner in the
course of the firm's business.
Such analogies from private commercial law and the law of torts are
dangerous, in my judgment, for transfer to the criminal field. Guilt there
...remains personal, not vicarious, for the more serious offenses. It
should be kept so.
Id. at 651 (citations omitted). Others agreed that the decision was an unwonted
extension of vicarious liability and ignored the distinction between substantive
offenses, complicity and conspiracy. See Note, supra note 2, at 374, 376-78 ("vicarious
criminal liability is repugnant to common law concepts") (citing Sayre, Criminal
Responsibilityfor the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 719 (1930)); see also
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 994-1000; Recent Decision, 16 FORDHAM
L. REV. 275, 277 (1947). One author conceded the existence of a rule under which
"the act of one conspirator is the act of all when committed within the scope of the
conspiracy," but argued it was only used to attribute an overt act in furtherance of a
conspiracy to all members, to show the extent and duration of a conspiracy and "as a
rule of evidence to connect all the defendants with the crime charged." Note, supra
note 2, at 375-76 (footnotes omitted) (before Pinkerton, no rule imposed "vicarious
liability for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators"). See also Johnson v.
United States, 62 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir. 1932). An article published thirteen years after
the decision stated that no court had yet "offered an adequate rationale for convicting
a conspirator for the crimes of his associates." Developments in the Law, supra note
2, at 998.
104. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 374; Developments in the Law, supra note
2, at 998; Recent Decision, supra note 103, at 275. Douglas was equally uninformative in a dissent issued the same day Pinkerton was decided, June 10, 1946. See
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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theories can be offered to explain his perfunctory treatment of this question,
it may be that Justice Douglas felt his discussion was adequate because coconspirator liability already seemed to be well-entrenched in American
criminal jurisprudence.' 0 5 For example, a federal judge cited this "familiar
rule" in 1885:
[W]here ... men combine ... to do an unlawful thing, and in the

prosecution of that unlawful intent one ...does acts which the balance do
not themselves perform, all are responsible for what the one does ....
[T]here must be... an agreement to do some unlawful thing. If there is
no such agreement
...then each individual is responsible simply for what
6
he does.1

Similar references appear in decisions dating at least as far back as 1807.'07

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 779 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("When
the jury found that each of the petitioners had entered into a conspiracy with Brown,
it made a complete determination of guilt as to that petitioner.").
105. A 1902 treatise noted that a conspirator "is liable for the acts of... all who
participate... in the.., unlawful purpose. Each conspirator is the agent of the other,
and the acts done are.., the acts of each and all." W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 149
(footnotes omitted).
106. United States v. Kane, 23 F. 748, 751 (C.C.D. Colo. 1885). Judge Brewer
observed that the rule was intended to "prevent combinations or conspiracies" and was
needed because "where there are many together it is often difficult to distinguish the
one who does any particular act." Id. at 752.
107. Accord Coates v. United States, 59 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1932); Bums v.
United States, 279 F. 982 (10th Cir. 1922); Samara v. United States, 263 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1920); Jung Quey v. United States, 222 F. 766 (9th Cir. 1915); United States v.
Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D.S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700); United States v. Babcock, 24
F. Cas. 913 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (No. 14,487); United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas.
1283 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 15,790); see United States. v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 764
(C.C.N.D. III. 1894) (When parties combine for an unlawful purpose, if one commits
a crime, "all are liable."). See generally Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 126
(1807) (when men combine for treason, all "who perform any part, however minute"
are traitors). Bollman used common law principles of "accessorial agency." See id. at
115-16; see also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 146, 150, 153, 154 (C.C.D.VA.
1807). See also id. at 150 ("if one advise or encourage another to commit [treason],
or furnish him means for that purpose ...the adviser will ...be a principal"). See

generally infra note 118 and accompanying text.
For state decisions, see Hanna v. People, 86 Ill.
243, 245 (1877) (if defendants
"had a common design" to commit a crime, any act done in furtherance "of the original
design is the act of all, and all are equally guilty of' it); Pollack v. State, 215 Wis.
200, 211, 253 N.W. 560, 565, aff'd, 215 Wis 200, 254 N.W. 471 (1934), overruledon
other grounds, State ex rel Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 262, 133 N.W.2d
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Fourteen years before Pinkerton was decided, the Ninth Circuit held that
"conspirators were partners in crime, and each was the agent of the other, and
each was bound by the act of the other in furthering the unlawful enterl
prise." '0
Although the rule applied in these decisions resembles the Pinkerton
doctrine, it differs from that doctrine in at least one important respect. To
understand this difference, it is necessary to clarify the premises of the older
rule. Spies v. People,1' 9 a decision which was often cited in applying it,
illustrates the basis of this rule."' The Spies defendants appealed their

753, 762 (1965) (conspirators "criminally responsible for the acts of [their] associates
committed in the prosecution of the common design"). Accord Williams v. State, 81
Ala. 1, 1 So. 179 (1887); People v. Bringhurst, 192 Cal. 748, 221 P. 897 (1923);
People v. Creeks, 170 Cal. 368, 149 P. 821 (1915); People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331,
92 P. 861 (1907); McMahon v. People, 189 Ill. 222; 59 N.E. 584 (1901); State v.
McCahill, 72 Iowa 111, 30 N.W. 553 (1886), aft'd, 72 Iowa 111, 33 N.W. 599 (1889);
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863); People v. Foley, 59
Mich. 553, 26 N.W. 699 (1886); Odom v. State, 172 Miss. 687, 161 So. 141 (1935);
Lusk v. State, 64 Miss. 845, 2 So. 256 (1887); State v. Miller, 52 R.I. 440, 161 A. 222
(1932); Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. Crim. 13, 4 S.W. 165 (1887); Whited v. Commmonwealth, 174 Va. 528, 6 S.E.2d 647 (1940); Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 384 (1870); see
also Adams v. State, 51 Ga. App. 30, 179 S.E. 417 (1935) (hog's death was the act
of all who conspired to steal it even though some were not present when it was killed).
The rule of co-conspirator liability appears in several pre-Pinkertontreatises. See
1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at 390; W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 149-50; 1 WARREN
ON HOMICIDE 232 (1938); 2 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 1830 (11th
ed. 1912). It was also used in civil cases. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Stewart, 18 Ind.
App. 262, 47 N.E. 943 (1897); Breedlove v. Bundy, 96 Ind. 319 (1884); Shoemaker
v. Jackson, 128 Iowa 488, 104 N.W. 503 (1906); Page v. Parker, 43 N.H. 363 (1861);
Kellogg v. Sowerby, 32 Misc. 327, 66 N.Y.S. 542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1900), affd, 100

N.Y.S. 1123 (App. Div. 1906), rev'd on other grounds, 190 N.Y. 370, 83 N.E. 47
(1907); Warshauer v. Webb, 9 N.Y. 529 (1887); F.R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection
Lodge, No. 215 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 77 Vt. 294, 60 A. 74 (1906). In 1935, the
Supreme Court held that Maxime Furlaud, president and principal shareholder of
Furlaud & Company and its subsidiary, Kingston Corporation, was personally liable
for wrongs committed by either entity because he "was the head and front of the
conspiracy. For anything done in fulfillment of the common purpose... he and his
confederates are liable in solido." McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140, 165 (1935).
108. Coates v. United States, 59 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1932). Accord Braatelien
v. United States, 147 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1945) (conspirator is "a partner and agent of
every other" conspirator).
109. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865, petition for writ of errordismissed, 123 U.S. 131
(1887).
110. Id. at 101-102, 12 N.E. at 915. For decisions citing Spies, see, e.g., Myers
v. State, 43 Fla. 500, 517, 31 So. 275, 280 (1901); People v. McKane, 143 N.Y. 455,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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convictions for murdering a policeman killed by a bomb.111 Because none of
them threw the bomb, they were charged and convicted as accessories before
the fact." 2 In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that this charge
was proper because the defendants had joined together to encourage
the murder of.. . policemen.... [Cqonspiracy... may be introduced [to
establish]... members of the combination as accessories to and principals;
by it all accessories before the fact are made principals. As the acts of the
principal are thus made the acts of the accessory, the latter may be3charged
as having done the acts himself, and.., punished accordingly.1
As this reveals, the pre-Pinkertonrule is merely an application of common

law complicity: participation in a conspiracy is used as evidence to establish
a defendant's liability as an accessory, or as a principal in jurisdictions that
no longer distinguish between principals and accessories, for offenses
perpetrated by other members of that conspiracy." 4

470, 38 N.E. 950, 954 (1894). See also W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 99.
111. Spies, 122 Ill. at 100, 12 N.E. at 914. On May 4, 1886, the "workingmen
of Chicago" were meeting at the Haymarket. Id.
This meeting was addressed by the defendants Spies, Parsons and
Fielden ....
[S]everal companies of policemen.., marched into the crowd
•.. and ordered the meeting to disperse. As soon as the order was given,
some one threw among the policemen a dynamite bomb, which struck
Degan, who was one of the police officers, and killed him.
Id.
112. Id. at 101, 12 N.E. at 914. ("It is conceded that no one of the convicted
defendants threw the bomb with his own hands."). They were charged under a statute
which defined an accessory as one who had "advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the
perpetration of the crime." Id., 12 N.E. at 915 (quoting ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, div.
2, § 2 (1986)). Under this statute, an accessory was treated as a principal "and
punished accordingly." Id., 12 N.E. at 915. For a summary of the facts that supported
the charges, see supra note 111.
113. Spies, 122 IlI. at 102, 12 N.E. at 915.
'114. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 94 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1938). The
defendants were charged with conspiracy and with substantive violations of federal
liquor laws. Id. at 753. According to the government, because they were parties to
the conspiracy and the substantive offenses were committed in furtherance of it, they
were "accomplices and responsible as principals" even if they did not actually
participate in committing the offenses. Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed. Id. at 753-54.
See also People v. McKane, 143 N.Y. 455, 465, 38 N.E. 950, 952 (1894) (conspiracy
was evidence "from which the jury might find ... that the defendant did counsel,
advise, and abet the unlawful acts"). For a statute abolishing the principal-accessory
distinction, see supra note 112. At common law, an aider and abettor could be
charged asbyanUniversity
accessory of
before
the fact
or a of
principal
in the second
degree. See,
e.g.,
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This rule is not based in conspiracy law but is simply a means of proving
complicity in the commission of substantive offenses. 115 Pinkerton is a
derivation of this rule.16 Rather than announcing a "theory of conspiratorial

Whited v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 528, 558, 6 S.E.2d 647, 660 (1940); W. CLARK,
supra, note 4, at 102-11. Some jurisdictions retain this distinction. See, e.g., State v.
Small, 301 N.C. 407, 413, 272 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1980).
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not common to charge
both conspiracy to commit substantive offenses and substantive offenses. The major
reason was the common law doctrine of merger, under which conspiracy merged into,
or was subsumed by, substantive offense. See, e.g., 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at

492; 2 F. WHARTON, supra note 107, at 1752; F. WHARTON, supra note 4, at 43-44.
Merger prevailed for much of the nineteenth century but was almost universally

rejected during the early decades of this century.

See, e.g., United States v.

Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915) (no merger); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 5 Mass.
106 (1809) (same); People v. Palmisano, 132 Misc. 244, 229 N.Y.S. 462 (1928)
(rejecting merger); Lambert v. People, 9 Cow. 578 (1827) (upholding merger).
Another reason was the dilatory development of conspiracy law. See, e.g., R. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES (1873); Sayre, CriminalConspiracy, 35 HARV.
L. REv. 393 (1922). As long as this reluctance existed, it was not necessary to
develop rules such as the Pinkerton doctrine that articulated the relationship between
liability for conspiracy and substantive offenses.
115. See, e.g., People v. Creeks, 170 Cal. 368, 149 P. 821 (1915); Whited v.
Commonwealth, 174 Va. 528,6 S.E.2d 647 (1940); see also Commonwealth v. Knapp,
26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 495, 518 (1830) (conspiracy is evidence proving "that the prisoner
aided, but it is not in itself... a legal presumption of his having aided"). In 1924,
Judge Learned Hand noted the disagreement that often existed in this area: "[M]y
brothers... invoke the principle that when once a man is shown to have engaged in
a conspiracy to commit some illegal act he becomes ...liable for everything which
his accomplices may do in its execution.... I understand no more than that their
conduct will be competent proof against him." Becher v. United States, 5 F.2d 45, 5051 (2d Cir. 1924). The evidentiary rule is still used. Accord United States v. Jackson,
627 F.2d 1198, 1216 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 41
(6th Cir. 1965), aft'd, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); United States v. Papia, 409 F. Supp. 1307,
1316 (E.D. Wis. 1976), aft'd, 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977); see United States v.
Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 153 (8th Cir. 1987) ("conspiracy may be shown as an
evidentiary fact to prove participation in the substantive crime") (citation omitted); see
also infra note 120 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 994-95.
[I]n ...Sall ...the Government argued that the conviction on the
substantive counts should stand because the proof that the accused had
entered the conspiracy amounted to proof that he had 'aided and abetted'
the commission of the substantive crimes ....The court rejected the idea,
apparentlynow acceptedhere, that 'aiding and abetting' and 'conspiring'
are ...the same thing, differing only in the form of the descriptive words.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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liability" independent of common law complicity, 117 it merely overruled Sall,
and held that membership in a conspiracy is sufficient, by itself, to establish
the "accessorial agency" necessary for the imposition of complicitous
liability.'
The major difference between Pinkerton and the older rule is

Sail, 328 U.S. at 650-51 n.4 (emphasis added); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text; HearingsOn Reform OfFederalCriminalLawBefore The Subcommittee On
CriminalLawAndProceduresOf The Senate Committee on The Judiciary,92d Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 1 at 225 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on Reform of FederalCriminal
Law] (Pinkerton described as imposing "complicity liability based solely upon
membership in the conspiracy"); infra note 118 and accompanying text.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected Pinkertonbecause they concluded
that "liability for a substantive crime as an accomplice cannot be predicated on the sole
fact of having been party to a conspiracy to commit that crime." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03(6) commentary at 143 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Accord MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.06 commentary at 307-09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Under the Model Penal
Code, evidence of conspiracy is admissible to prove complicity, but whether it is
sufficient to do so is left to the jury. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 309
("they should not be told that it establishes complicity as a matter of law").
117. See, e.g., May, supra note 101, at 40-41 n.120 (1983). See generally United
States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987) (although 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988)
makes conspiracy a separate crime, "coconspirator liability does not have its genesis
in this statute, but rather in the common law").
118. "In Pinkerton ... [w]e held that a conspirator could be held guilty of the
substantive offense even though he did no more than join the conspiracy." Nye &
Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618, 621 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(Under Pinkerton,a jury can use evidence of a conspiracy "to supply the lack of direct
evidence of participation in the substantive offenses"); Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 451 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Pinkerton applied "the novel and
dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and abetting"); United
States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981):
[Pinkerton]'collapses the distinction between accessories and perpetrators'
through the doctrine of conspiratorial complicity, which punishes conspirators as principals in any substantive offense committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy, whether or not they directly participated in that offense....
Thus, if a conspiracy is charged, the prosecution need not analyze whether
a... conspirator's actions would ordinarily be sufficient to create liability

as an abettor of an offense; all that is necessary is proof that the defendant
joined in an unlawful agreement.
Id. (citations omitted). The reference to "accessorial agency" in the text is taken from
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (no. 14,693); State v. Small,
301 N.C. 407, 416 n.6, 272 S.E.2d 128, 134 n.6 (1980) (a "finding that defendant
conspired to commit the substantive offense is legally equivalent to a finding that
defendant counseled, procured, aided, or abetted" commission of that offense);
Hearings on Reform of FederalCriminal Law, supra note 116, at 225 (Pinkerton

"imposes complicity liability based solely upon membership in the conspiracy"); May,
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that Pinkerton effectively creates a presumption of aiding and abetting
offenses committed in furtherance of the goals of a conspiracy from
membership in that conspiracy."' Under the older rule, membership was

supranote 101, at 35, 39-41 ("restatement of the common law doctrine" of accessorial
liability).
119. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 625 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
The Court ... seems to [infer] that the defendant, because of his ...
connection with the conspiracy, must ... have been ... an aider and

abettor in the.., substantive crimes ....

[T]o draw such an inference is

to ... create ... a presumption that whenever A has been found guilty of

conspiring with B and C to bring X, Y and Z to pass, and A and B commit
the substantive offenses L, M and N, during the ... conspiracy, C is an
aider and abettor... in the commission of L, M and N.
See also Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability,93 YALE hJ. 609, 614-15 n.14 (1984)
(Pinkertonpresumption frequently results in liability because a defendant "is unable

to rebut it"); Note, supra note 2, at 376 ("conclusive presumption that each conspirator
aids and abets every act within the scope of the conspiracy").
For a decision upholding Pinkerton against the argument that it "unconstitutional-

ly creates a mandatory presumption," see United States v. Deluna, 763 F.2d 897, 918
(8th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Thomas v. United States, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). See

also United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 152 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987) (similar argument
rejected); United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1540-41 (2d Cir. 1983).
Pinkerton liability is submitted to the jury by tendering an instruction to this
effect:

A member of a conspiracy who commits another crime during the...
conspiracy... may be... acting as the agent of the other members of the
conspiracy .... [A]ctions of this person ... may be attributed to other...
members ....
If you find... defendant
guilty of conspiracy.., you
may also find defendant
guilty of the crime alleged in any

other count of the indictment in which [he][she] is charged, provided you
find that the.., elements of that count.., have been established beyond
reasonable doubt and...
One, that the substantive offense.., was committed by a member of
the conspiracy ...
Two, that the substantive crime was committed during the existence
or life of and in furtherance of the goal(s) or objective(s) of the conspiracy;
and
Three, at the time this offense was committed, defendant __
was a member of the conspiracy.
2 E. DEvrTr, C. BLACKMAR & K. O'MALLEY, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 28.10 at 193-94 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis
added). The Seventh Circuit's instruction is more directive. See 3 CoMMIarEE ON
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. 6 (West Pamphlet 1986)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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evidence of complicity but did not give rise to a presumption.1"
The relationship between the two principles is illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume that X conspires with A, B, and C to import illegal drugs into
the United States. Assume that X does nothing thereafter to further the goals
of the conspiracy, but also does nothing to terminate her involvement in it.

Under Pinkerton, if A, B and/or C carry out their plan and actually import
illegal drugs into this country, X can be convicted of substantive drug offenses
based upon that importation even though she did not personally participate in
it. The rationale for this liability remains to be considered, but her liability
under Pinkerton is assured because (a) she joined a conspiracy to import
illegal drugs, and (b) the substantive offenses were committed in furtherance
of the goals of that conspiracy."'
Under the older rule, her membership in the conspiracy could be used as
evidence to prove her complicity in the commission of the substantive

("if you find... that ... his fellow conspirator(s) committed the offense(s) charged
in Count(s) _
in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of that conspiracy,
then you should find him guilty of Count(s)
") (emphasis added). See also United
States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., concurring)
(Pinkerton alters the elements of an offense and respecifies them as "(1) the
defendant's membership in the conspiracy, and (2) commission of the substantive
offense by any member(s) acting pursuant to the conspiracy"); United States v.
Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Once the conspiracy and the defendant's
knowing participation in it have been established... the defendant will be vicariously
liable for the substantive acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy .... ").
120. See, e.g., supra notes 115-16; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 commentary at
23 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953) ("Conspiracy may prove command, encouragement,
assistance.... But whether it suffices ought to be decided by the jury; they should
not be told that it establishes complicity as a matter of law."); see also State v. Small,
301 N.C. 407, 418-21, 272 S.E.2d 128, 135-37 (1980) (conspiracy may establish
complicity).
121. See Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 618 (Douglas, J.) (Pinkerton "held that a

conspirator could be held guilty of the substantive offense even though he did no more
than join the conspiracy, provided that the substantive offense was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy and as a part of it."); see also United States v. Alvarado,
898 F.2d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1393
n.3 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989); United States v. Basey, 816
F.2d 980, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 681-82 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 863 (1985); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1520 n.23 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); United States v. Molina, 581 F.2d 56, 60
n.7 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. LeFaivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1298-99 (4th Cir. 1974).
See generally Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 621 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Pinkerton
liability exists only if "there is a connection between the conduct of the conspiracy and
the commission of the substantive offenses").
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offenses. This alone, however, would not suffice under the standard used in
federal prosecutions.?22 Judge Learned Hand enunciated this standard in
United States v. Peoni."2 To qualify as an aider and abettor under Peoni,
one must associate herself with a criminal venture and commit an affirmative
act by which she intends to promote the success of that venture. 24
Although X did associate herself with a criminal venture, she took no action
to further its success. Consequently, her liability for substantive offenses must
1 5
be determined under Pinkerton.2

122. This standard is presently codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See supra notes
38-40.
123. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). To be an accomplice, one must "associate
himself with the venture... participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring
about." Id. at 402. The Peoni standard is also used in various states. See, e.g., Hill
v. State, 348 So.2d 848 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Ex parte State ex rel
Attorney General, 348 So.2d 857 (Ala. 1977); State v. Harper, 365 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va.
1987); Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1984); Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d
862 (D.C. 1984).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 436, (7th Cir. 1991)
("'To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the state of mind
required for the statutory offense; to prove participation.., there must be evidence
to establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct ... designed to
aid in the success of the venture."' (quoting United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448
(7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978)); see
also Peoni,100 F.2d at 402 (to be an aider and abettor of a criminal venture, one must
"seek by his action to make it succeed").
125. It is also possible to aid and abet an attempt to commit a substantive offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (aiding and abetting attempted
evasion of income taxes); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982)
(aiding and abetting attempt to manufacture phencyclidine); United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984 (1958)
(aiding and abetting attempted evasion of income taxes); United States v. Swann, 377
F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1974) (aiding and abetting attempted taking of migratory
waterfowl with aid of bait); United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323 (D. Pa. 1956)
(aiding and abetting attempted armed robbery). It is equally possible to attempt to aid
and abet the commission of such an offense. See, e.g., United States v. Cartlidge, 808
F.2d 1064, 1066 (5th Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Reed v. Lane, 759 F.2d 618,
623 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); United States v. Martin, No.
Crim. A. 89-376 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library.); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06(3)(a)(ii), 5.01(3), 5.01(3), commentary at 297-98, 356
(1985) ("attempts to aid"); cf. United States v. Giovanneti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th
Cir. 1990). Imposing liability for attempted aiding and abetting or for aiding and
abetting an attempt is a departure from traditional common law principles. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant "charged with
aiding and abetting the commission of crime by another cannot be convicted in the
absence of proof that the crime was actually committed"); accord United States v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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Imposing liability under Pinkerton when a defendant's conduct is
insufficient for the imposition of liability under Peoni gives rise to an apparent
paradox: by allowing complicity in substantive offenses to be presumed from
membership in a conspiracy, Pinkerton seems to abrogate one prong of the
Peoni standard and predicate liability upon the mere act of associating oneself
with a criminal venture.
Because Peoni requires association plus an
affirmative act of participation in the venture's criminal affairs, Pinkerton
seems open to the objection that it implements a crippled form of aiding and
abetting liability, a kind of "guilt by association."1
That objection can be overcome, and Pinkerton and Peoni can be
reconciled, if they are construed as addressing two different forms of
complicitous liability. In this perspective, one can incur complicitous liability
in either of two ways: (a) by engaging in conduct that is designed to further
the success of a criminal venture, or (b) by entering into the agreement that
constitutes such a venture.127 The gravamen of complicitous liability is the

Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970); see also
Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the InterpretationofDoctrine, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 355-57 (1985). See generally United States v. Arbelaez, 812 F.2d
530 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 310 n.7 (7th Cir. 1984).
126. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 626 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (improper to use conspiracy "to establish guilt, not on the
basis of personal responsibility, but by association"); see also Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961) ("guilt is personal, and when ...punishment ...[is]
justified by ...the relationship of... status or conduct to other concededly criminal
activity ... that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of
personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment"); People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 88, 136 N.E. 505, 530 (1922) ("guilt by
association" is inconsistent with the fundamental principle "of American jurisprudence
...that 'guilt is personal"); cf.Whitney v. People of California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
(conviction for violating state Criminal Syndicalism Act). See generally Goldstein,
The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEO. L.J. 133 (1965).
127. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 620:
Pinkerton ...does service where the conspiracy was one to commit
offenses of the character described in the substantive counts. Aiding and
abetting has a broader application. It makes a defendant a principal when
he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a
conspiracy.... Aiding and abetting. . . states a rule of criminal responsibility for acts which one assists another in performing.
See also United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (policies underlying Pinkerton and
complicity "very similar"). "[Tihe Pinkerton and the aider-and-abettor doctrines
embody the same principle: a defendant who willingly enters into a confederacy of
crime can legitimately be held accountable for all reasonably foreseeable offenses
committed by his confederates." Id. at 1426 n.14.
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act of affiliating oneself with a criminal endeavor. Pinkerton and Peoni
enunciate the tests used to determine if there has been such an act under either
of the alternatives given above:"1 Peoni addresses the first-affiliation by
conduct designed to aid the venture; Pinkerton addresses the
second-affiliation by agreement.
Under Pinkerton, a prospective defendant explicitly indicates her desire
to affiliate with a criminal venture; the process is analogous to executing a
contract, although usually not so formal. In the hypothetical above, X incurs
Pinkerton liability by entering into a criminal contract with A, B, and C, and
this contract defines the limits of her liability for substantive offenses.
Because these contracts are by definition sub rosa, the government is unlikely
to be able to offer direct proof of their terms. Once it proves the existence
and general tenor of such an agreement, however, it is reasonable to put the
onus on a defendant to show that particular crimes were outside the scope of
her agreement.
Under Peoni, there is no contract-the act of affiliating with a criminal
undertaking is implicit in conduct that is engaged for the purpose of
supporting the affairs of such an undertaking. The factual predicate for this
type of liability is more ambiguous, as it is possible to engage in conduct that
promotes the goals of a criminal undertaking without meaning to do so. For
that reason, this type of complicitous liability requires that one "associate"
herself with a criminal venture and that she, herself, perform some affirmative
act "in furtherance" of the goals of that venture as the predicate for liability. 129 Requiring both is intended to overcome the ambiguity inherent in

128. See, e.g., Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 ("Each conspirator instigated the
commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement.., was formed for the purpose.
The act done was in execution of the enterprise. The rule which holds responsible one
who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime is founded on the
same principle."). As to the distinctions between the two types of affiliative liability,
see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[Ilf a
conspiracy is charged, the prosecution need not analyze whether a... conspirator's
actions would ordinarily be sufficient to create liability as an abettor of an offense; all
that is necessary is proof that the defendant joined in an unlawful agreement."); see
also United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 681 (5th Cir. 1985) ("a party to a
continuing conspiracy may be responsible for a substantive offense committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though that party does not participate
in the substantive offense or have any knowledge of it"). Pinkerton liability will not
attach, however, unless the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the
goals of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 628 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("A ... mere joiner is not guilty of the substantive offense unless the
substance was part of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it").
• 129. See, e.g., United States v. Mehtala, 578 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1978) (citations
omitted) ("Mere association between the principal and those accused of aiding and
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predicating criminal liability upon conduct that may or may not be criminal
in and of itself. 0 This is why juries are not allowed the luxury of a

abetting is not sufficient to establish guilt; nor is mere presence at the scene and
knowledge that a crime was to be committed sufficient to establish aiding and
abetting.").
"'Association' means that the defendant shared in the criminal intent of the
principal. 'Participation' means that the defendant engaged in some affinative conduct
designed to aid the venture.... Thus, an aiding and abetting offense has two
components: (1) an act by a defendant which contributes to the execution of the
criminal activity, and (2) the intent to aid in its commission." United States v. Triplett,
922 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2245 (1991) (citing United
States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777 F.2d 973, 980 (5th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Kaufman,
858 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360,
367 (5th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Ramirez-Rios v. United States, 484 U.S. 957
(1987); United States v. Weddell, 800 F.2d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Stovall, 825 F.2d 817, 827 (5th Cir. 1987). Accord United States v. EscruceriaDelgado, 887 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441,
448 (7th Cir. 1980).
To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the state
of mind required for the.., offense; to prove participation... 'there must
be evidence to establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative
conduct; that is, there must be evidence that [the] defendant committed an
overt act designed to aid in the success of the venture.'
Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978)). For
a case distinguishing the factual predicates for these two forms of complicity, see
United States v. Garcia-Flores, 925 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1991) which stated the
following:
Garcia-Flores need not actually distribute the heroin to be liable for its
distribution under an aiding and abetting theory.... We may uphold the
conviction if [he] associated with the criminal venture, participated in it,
and sought by his actions to make it succeed.... [T]he government may
prove liability under a co-conspirator theory. Based on Pinkerton ...
Garcia-Flores may be guilty even if he did not directly participate in the
drug transaction ....
Id. (citing United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 943 (1988); United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir.
1987); United States v. Anderson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Many conspiracy statutes do not require performance of an overt act as an
element of the offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) discussed infra section
HI(C) of this Article, pp. 983-85. Those that do require such an act only insist that
it have been committed by some member of the conspiracy; there is no need to prove
that each defendant committed such an act. See, e.g., Bannon v. United States, 156
U.S. 464 (1895); Onderdonk v. United States, 16 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1926).
130. For example, consider the facts in United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d
Cir. 1940), described supra note 49. It is not a crime to lease premises or to purchase
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Pinkerton-stylepresumption in determining accomplice liability; instead, they
must weigh the evidence of "association" plus "participation" and decide
whether it is sufficient to establish this type of liability as to certain

offenses.'
Although American law is loath to predicate criminal liability upon
"affiliation,"' this concept accurately denotes the concern that underlies

and operate a truck. If, however, these actions are taken by one who has "associated"
himself with a criminal venture, they become indicia of complicity and can result in
the imposition of substantive criminal liability. Id. See also United States v. Petersen,
777 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 843 (1986) (container of yellow
Forest Service tracer paint under driver's seat of defendant's truck was sufficient to
show aiding and abetting offense of removing healthy trees from United States forest).
By the same token, conduct that seems inherently unlawful cannot support imposition

of such liability absent a demonstrable link between it and the offense(s) charged. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 631 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980) (wiping fingerprints off car
purchased with stolen check insufficient to support inference of aiding and abetting
possession of check); United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980) (providing hospitality to robbers was not sufficient to
support aiding and abetting liability absent proof that host participated in the planning
and/or execution of the robbery).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 704 F.2d 554 (11th Cir. 1983) (evidence
sufficient to establish aiding and abetting interstate travel for purposes of prostitution);
United States v. Campbell, 702 F.2d 262 (I5.C. Cir. 1983) (evidence insufficient to
establish aiding and abetting the giving of an illegal gratuity). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 388 (1985) ("The act of agreeing with another to
commit a crime... is concrete and unambiguous.... The danger that truly equivocal
behavior may be misinterpreted as preparation to commit a crime is minimized;
purpose must be relatively firm before the commitment involved in agreement is
assumed.") (footnote omitted).
132. Its use seems to have been limited to prosecutions for falsely denying an
affiliation with the Communist Party. See, e.g., Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64
(1969) (prosecution under § 9(h) of National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h)
(1988)); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961) (same); Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657 (1957) (same); Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 631 (1961) (same); Lohman v. United States, 251
F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1958) (same). Many of these cases required a definition of
"affiliation." See, e.g., Bryson, 396 U.S. at 369 n.7, which stated the following:
[A]ffiliated ... means a relationship short of ... membership in the
Communist Party, but more than.., sympathy for the aims and objectives
of the Communist Party. A person may be found to be 'affiliated' with an
organization ... when there is ... a close working alliance or association
between him and the organization, together with a mutual understanding...
that the organization can... depend upon him to cooperate with it, and to
work for its benefit. . .. [A]ffiliation ... means a relationship which is
equivalent or equal to that of membership in all but name.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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both Peoni and Pinkerton. That concern is with a peculiar type of criminal
act-the act of aligning with another or others to achieve some unlawful
purpose."s This concern was not created by the forces that shaped federal
criminal law in this century, but it has been exacerbated by them.3

Accord Killian, 368 U.S. at 256 n.13; Travis, 269 F.2d at 946; see also Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 206 (1961) (prosecution under the Smith Act which made

it an offense to affiliate with "any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow ... of... government by force or violence").
Scales is discussed at infra note 133. For a critique of predicating criminal liability
upon one's associations, see, e.g., Nathanson, Freedom ofAssociation and the Quest
for InternalSecurity: Conspiracyfrom Dennis to Dr.Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153
(1970). For definitions of "affiliate," see BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 80 (rev. 4th ed.
1968) ("a condition of being united, being in close connection, allied, or attached as
a member..., to associate with"); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 43 (2d ed. unabr. 1955) ("To band together... [t]o connect
or associate oneself'). See generallyJencks, 353 U.S. at 679 (Burton, J., concurring
in result).
133.
Any thought that due process puts beyond the
reach of the criminal law all ... associational relationships, unless accompanied by ... specific acts of
criminality, is dispelled by.. . the law of conspiracy
and complicity. While both are commonplace in the
landscape of the criminal law, they are not natural
features. Rather they are particular legal concepts
manifesting the more general principle that society,
having the power to punish dangerous behavior,

cannot be powerless against those who work to bring
about that behavior.
Scales, 367 U.S. at 225. Accord id. at 225 n.17 ("considerable overlap" between "the
law of complicity and the law of conspiracy"); see also Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (statute directed "not at the practice
of criminal syndicalism ... but at association with those who propose to preach it").
State attitudes toward Pinkerton liability are beyond the scope of this Article.
For an overview of state attitudes, however, see Pendleton v. State, 57 Ala. App. 454,
329 So.2d 145 (1976); Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1113, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972);
People v. Carmichael, 164 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1980); Norman v. State, 381 So. 2d 1024
(Miss. 1980); State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407,421,272 S.E.2d 128, 137 (1980) (rejecting
Pinkerton);State v. Stein, 70 N.J. 369,360 A.2d 347 (1976); Commonwealth v. Roux,
465 Pa. 482, 350 A.2d 867 (1976); State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033 (R.I. 1981)
(Pinkerton liability is "an occupational hazard" of conspiracy).
134. Conspiracy began with a statute enacted in 1285 to penalize the bringing of

false prosecutions and slowly evolved into its modem form. Sayre, supra note 114,
at 393-409; see also Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. J. 328, 338-352
(1947); Winfield, Early History of CriminalConspiracy, 36 LAW Q. REV. 240 (1920).
In 1611, the Court of Star Chamber held that an "agreement to commit a crime [was]
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Since 1960, federal criminal law has adopted new and more expansive
rules for imposing liability because of the perception, if not the reality, that
criminal activity has increasingly assumed a new and more dangerous
form-"organized crime."13 The notion that organized criminal activity
poses special dangers has existed for centuries, 13 6 but the perception of the
incidence and magnitude of that activity in this country grew exponentially in
the years after World War II, as Americans discovered "racketeering" and "the
1 37

mob."

a substantive crime in itself', and conspiracy evolved into an offense in its own right.
Accord Sayre, supranote 114, at 398; Blair, Judge Made Law of Conspiracy, 37 AM,
L. REv. 33, 54 (1903); see Pollack, supra, at 341; Poulterers' Case, 9 Co. Rep. 55b,
77 Eng. Rep. R.813 (1611). For a discussion of the history of complicity, see supra
section II(A) of this article, pp. 932-35; see also United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401
(2d Cir. 1938).
135. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
[C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a greater
potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both
increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained
and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from
their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes ...
makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one
criminal could accomplish. Nor is the danger ... limited to the particular
end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more
likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which
the group was formed.
Id. at 593-94. Accord Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 157 (1977) ("additional
dangers posed by concerted activity"); United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d
1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984); State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1036 (R.I. 1981)
("criminals will engage in more elaborate and complex schemes than they would
attempt if working alone"); Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 923-25;
Pollack, supra note 134, at 339 ("danger from the increased power" of "a combination
of many individuals").
136. See supra notes 132-35.
137. See infra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 979-81; see also BRADLEY,
RACKETEERING AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME

235-42 (1975).

Early in 1950 an accumulation of events highlighted the desperate need for
learning ... about crime in America. The American Municipal Associa-

tion, alarmed by the effects of interstate crime operations on local
governments, had passed a resolution calling for federal consideration of the
problem.

Newspapers ... were making startling disclosures about the

power of modem crimesters ... successors to the Al Capones of an earlier
era. The Conference on Organized Crime, called by Attorney General J.
Howard McGrath in February 1950, focused additional attention on the
cancer of organized crime.
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This discovery led to the enactment of federal statutes that were designed
to give prosecutors new weapons to use against what was regarded as a
flourishing, increasingly-sophisticated evil. 38 The consequence was that

Id.; E. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERiCA 2 (1951). During 1950 and 1951, Kefauver
chaired a Senate Committee that investigated what he characterized as a "national
crime syndicate." Id. at xi, 331. The work of this committee influenced the enactment
of the measures noted above. See infra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 979-85; see
also S. REP. No. 307, 82d. Cong., 1st. Sess. 150 (1951) (THiRD INTERIM REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITIEE To INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE); E. KEFAUVER supra, at 1 ("[t]here is a Nation-wide crime syndicate

known as the Mafia, whose tentacles are found in many large cities"). See generally.
W. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITEE AND THE PoLIncs OF CRIME 1950-52, 200
(1974) (public response to the Kefauver report "amounted to an unprecedented
frenzy").
138. See infra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 979-81. In a 1961 speech, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy claimed that "'the situation is worse than it was 10 years ago
in terms of the financial power of the racketeers, the extent of their operations, the
number of people involved and their political power."' He proposed several statutes
which he claimed
would be a mortal blow to their operations.... All... were enacted....
[T]hese bills reached out to punish acts that were on their face completely
innocent, but became wrongful because they aided activities that were
unlawful under state law. Thus, making a telephone call or driving across
state lines with the requisite intent was now a crime.
Bradley, supra note 137, at 242-43 (quoting Washington Star, Aug. 13, 1961, reprinted
in 107 CONG. REc. 6414 app. (1961) (citingLegislationRelating To OrganizedCrime:
Hearings Before Subcommittee Of The House Committee On The Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 32 (1961); 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1978); Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat.
498 (1961); Pub. L. No. 87-368, 75 Stat. 795 (1961); Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491
(1961); Pub. L. No. 87-218, 75 Stat. 491 (1961); Pub. L. No. 87-840, 76 Stat. 1075
(1961); S.1665, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S.1656, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961);
HearingsBefore The Senate Committee On The Judiciary: The Attorney General's
Program To Curb Organized Crime And Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1961); Miller, A FederalViewpoint on CombattingOrganized Crime, 347 ANNALS
93, 94 (1963))).
One of the statutes that came out of this era was the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, which is discussed infra section I1(C) of this
Article, pp. 979-85. The apprehensions that gave rise to these enactments survived
through the 1970's and were exacerbated by the "war on drugs" during the 1980's.
See generally Schuler & McBride, Notes from the Front: A DissidentLaw-enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 893 (1990); Note,
User-AccountabilityProvisions in the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988: Assaulting Civil
Liberties in the War on Drugs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1989). Federal statutes were
enacted to combat organized crime because of a perception that states were unable to
deal with the problem. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 137, at 242-54.
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federal criminal law acquired a tolerance for doctrines that expand criminal
139
While the
liability beyond the confines established by the common law.
Pinkerton doctrine may have been based in common law, it was fortuitously
enunciated at the moment when American criminal law was discovering the
threat of organized crime and the need to develop sophisticated weapons with
which to combat it.
Pinkerton seemed unproblematic and was compatible with the weapons
that were devised for this purpose, so courts saw no need to scrutinize its
doctrinal provenance. Consequently, although the doctrine is employed

reasonably often, at least in federal law, its rationale remains undefined.14
Decisions enforcing co-conspirator liability methodically recite Justice
why civil
Douglas' aphorism about partnership and agency without explaining
141
law principles should support the imposition of criminal liability.
The first step in remedying this omission is to clarify what Pinkerton is
not: it is not a rule of vicarious liability, despite being characterized as
such. 42 In civil law, vicarious liability doctrines hold one person liable for
the acts of another; the most common instance is holding an employer liable
for the acts of her employee(s).' 43 While these rules have their own
ambiguities, it is clear that they reflect a policy of allocating the risks that
144
inhere in certain lawful activities to those who are best able to bear them.

139. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 137, at 242-54.
140. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 998; see also State v.
Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1036 (R.I. 1981) ("Pinkerton rule has found favor.., under
a variety of theories").
141. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; see also State v. Bums, 215
Minn. 182, 9 N.W.2d 518 (1943) (criminal law rejected respondeat superior); Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 688, 694-701
(1930).
142. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 993-1000; see also
United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1219 (8th Cir. 1991) ("vicarious liability for
crimes committed by one's co-conspirator is set forth in Pinkerton"); United States v.
Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 878 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985) ("the
Pinkerton theory of vicarious liability").
143. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 7, at § 3.9; R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 6, at 911-14; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 69 (4th ed. 1971). This is common in tort law and can extend to imposing liability
upon an artificial entity, such as a corporation, for the acts of its agents or employees.
See, e.g., 1 K. BRIcKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 3.01-.08 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1968)
(master's liability for servant) comment on Subsection (1) (Rationale of liability);
Douglas, VicariousLiability andAdministration ofRisk I & 11, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720
(1929). It is interesting to note that Douglas' interest in vicarious liability preceded
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Because this liability is grounded in social utility concerns, it is considered
reasonable to impose liability upon a party even though no act of that party
145
actually caused the injury for which redress is sought.
Criminal law has been hesitant to accept vicarious liability because
criminal accountability has traditionally been based upon one's own wrongful
conduct."4 Because Justice Douglas couched it in agency terms, Pinkerton
has been construed as imposing vicarious liability 4 7-- but it does not.
Instead of abrogating "the need for a personal actus reus" as an element of
liability,' 48 the Pinkerton doctrine holds a party liable for the consequences
of a specific personal act-affiliating with another for criminal purposes. This
act permits imposition of liability for crimes committed by those with whom
one shares such a relationship. The non-acting party is liable for these offenses

Pinkerton. See Douglas, supra. In analyzing its use in civil cases, he considered the
rationale for imposing liability upon partnerships and, in so doing, emphasized the
importance of voluntary association, control and the capacity to distribute risks as
factors warranting the imposition of such liability. Id. at 720-39.
145. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 comment on
Subsection (1) (1968); see also infra note 146 (noting that civil actions seek an award
of damages). In civil law, especially tort law, liability is rationalized under this
premise: One party-the "principal"-is liable for the acts of another-his
"agent"-because the principal has a duty to exercise some form of control over the
agent. The principal's liability is regarded as resulting from an act of omission, i.e.,
failing to exert the necessary control, which proximately caused the complained-of
injury to occur. Sayre, supra note 141, at 689-94; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 6, at 911-12 ("On this basis, the publisher of a newspaper may be guilty of a libel
appearing in its pages without his knowledge.").
146. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 141, at 694-96, 717 n.102 (law imposing a fine
on "residents of a city ward in which a murder occurred would be held unconstitutional"). Another reason for the hesitance in this regard is the consequence of conviction:
An employer who is held civilly liable for acts of an employee will be forced to pay
damages but one found criminally liable faces severe penalties, including imprisonment. See id. at 695; J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 254-55 (2d
ed. 1960).
147. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1968) (master is
liable for "the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment"). See United States v. Troop, 890 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989)

("conspirators are agents of each other and just as a principal is bound by the acts of
his agents within the scope of the agency, so is a conspirator bound by the acts of his
co-conspirators"). The opinion uses language that is reminiscent of civil doctrines of
respondeatsuperior,especially in limiting liability to crimes that are within the "scope
of the conspiracy."
148. W. LAFAVE & A. SCoTr, supra note 7, at 250. Vicarious liability eliminates
the need for a personal act as a prerequisite for criminal liability. See id. at 193-95;
infra note 140; W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 69.
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because her criminal act of allying herself with the acting party "caused" them
to be committed.149

149. "[O]ne who contributes his will to a crime, by whomsoever the physical act
of wrong is done, is guilty of the crime." 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at 385. The
causal premise noted above is analogous to the duty-fictive or otherwise-that provides
the predicate for vicarious liability in tort law. See supra note 143 and accompanying
text. Both use conduct of the non-acting party that was not the immediate cause of
the harm complained of as the basis for liability. Both construe this conduct as
"causing" the harm in question. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219,
comment on Subsection (1) (1968); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 911-12,
And in both contexts the non-actor's conduct is seen as the "proximate" cause of the
harm. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 7, at 281-82.
Proximate cause becomes an issue when the precipitating relationship between
an act and a result is ambiguous. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 430-432 (1976); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 774 (proximate cause
is "a cause of which the law will take notice"). Holding one party liable-civilly or
criminally-for another's acts implicates proximate cause because that person is being
held liable for actions that were at least the immediate result of another individual's
free will. Because coercion is not applied to ensure that the actor performs in a certain
manner, it is difficult to say that the non-actor's conduct was the "but-for" cause of the
resulting harm. See J. HALL, supra note 146, at 234-37, 247-57, 261-70. See
generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 7, at 279 (conduct causes a result when
that result would not have occurred "but for" the conduct); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.03(1) (1985) (causal conduct is "an antecedent but for which the result in question
would not have occurred"). Tort law uses social utility considerations to justify
imposing liability on non-actors, which gives it more leeway in determining the
consequences for which liability will be imposed. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOWr,
supra note 7, at 282 (tort law requires a non-actor "to pay for the damage actually
caused without regard" to likelihood "on the theory that.., he... should bear the
cost"); see also Beale, The ProximateConsequences ofan Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633
(1920). For various reasons, arguably criminal law requires "a closer relationship
between the result achieved and that intended or hazarded." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr,
supra note 7, at 282 (footnotes omitted); see also J. HALL, supra note 146, at 254-57.
But it does incorporate the concept of proximate cause, so liability can be imposed
even when it is not possible to show that there was a direct, immediate relationship
between an actor's conduct and a given result. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr,
supra note 7, at 281-99; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 776-85. Because
proximate cause in criminal law is also a function of social policy, the standard for its
assessment can vary across offenses. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
6, at 777. See generally J. HALL, supra note 146, at 284-95. Pinkerton applied a
standard of proximate causation used in mail fraud cases to conspiracy. See supra
notes 70-79 and accompanying text. In mail fraud, it was used to determine causation
for the purpose of imposing complicitous liability. See, e.g., Blue v. United States, 138
F.2d 351, 362 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1943); United States v. Weisman,
83 F.2d 470, 474 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 560 (1936); Van Riper v. United
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This act satisfies the criteria for imposing accountability under the
traditional criminal law standard of personal liability: affiliating with another
for criminal purposes is a voluntary act committed with a culpable mental
state, or mens rea, that causes a prohibited social harm.150 In either of its
guises, as Pinkerton liability or as complicitous liability, this act is clearly
more culpable than the act that suffices for imposition of vicarious liability in
civil law. In torts, for example, one is liable for failing to prevent a harm; in
affiliative liability, one is liable for engaging in affirmative conduct that is

States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926); Murray v.
United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1925); Dalton v. United States, 154 F. 461,
462 (7th Cir. 1907); Burton v. United States, 142 F. 57, 62 (8th Cir. 1906); Hume v.
United States, 118 F. 689, 697-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 189 U.S. 510 (1903). One
who had not personally used the mails to further a scheme to defraud could be held
liable for another's use on the theory that she "caused" that use by participating in the
scheme. See, e.g., Demolli v. United States, 144 F. 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1906) (causation
is present if one "does an act, the natural and probable consequence of which... is"
use of the mails).
The mail fraud standard is a particular application of the generally attenuated
causation requirements that are used for complicitous liability. See, e.g., Dressier,
Reassessingthe TheoreticalUnderpinningsofAccomplice Liability: New Solutions to
an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 102 (1985) ("The most trivial assistance is
sufficient basis to render the secondary actor accountable for the actions of the primary
actor."). Since Pinkerton and accomplice liability share an underlying rationale-the
concept of criminal affiliation-it was reasonable to apply the standard of causation
used for accomplice liability to Pinkerton liability. See infra notes 166-194 and
accompanying text.
150. Generally criminal liability is considered to require four elements-a
voluntary act (actus reus), a guilty mind (mens rea), causation and some prohibited
social harm. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTt, supra note 7, at 193-94; Hall, supra note
146, at 70-104, 171-80, 212-22, 247-81. Consummating a criminal affiliation satisfies
all four elements. (1) actus reus-this is the uncoerced act of aligning with another
or others to pursue a criminal design. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, supra note
7, at 195-200; see also infra note 151 and accompanying text. (2) Mens rea-in
aligning with others, the individual acts with the purpose of facilitating achievement
of the criminal design; this purpose constitutes the necessary "guilty mind." See, e.g.,
W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 7, at 216-231; see also infra note 186 and
accompanying text. (3) Causation-thisis considered supra note 149 and accompanying text. See generally J. HALL, supra note 146, at 279 ("Causation concerns a
relationship, and in criminal law one of the relata is a definitely described harm.").
(4) Harm-"harm" has different meanings with regard to different offenses. See J.
HALL, supra note 146, at 212-22; W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note 7, at 530-31;
MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 5.03, commentary at 387 (1985); see also R. PERKINS & R.

BOYCE, supra note 6, at 12 ("Crime is any social harm defined and made punishable
by law."). In this context, the "harm" is the creation of a combination that if dedicated
to achieving an unlawful purpose.
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intended to result in perpetration of a harm the consequences of which are
likely to be far more sinister than the harms encountered in-tort law.151 The
culpability of the affiliative criminal act is enhanced not only by its foreseeable consequences but also.by its purposiveness. As opposed to the act that

gives rise to civil liability, this act is taken for the purpose of promoting

commission of a criminal act.15 2 The only element of criminal liability
that is attenuated under Pinkerton is causation, which receives the same
153
treatment accorded it under the kindred doctrine of accomplice liability.
Liability can attach under either form of affiliative liability without showing

151. In complicity, the affirmative act is, e.g., aiding, abetting, counseling,
commanding, procuring, inducing or causing the commission of a criminal act or an
attempt to commit such an act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text; supra note 118 (attempted aiding and abetting). Complicitous
liability also attaches to attempts to aid or abet commission of a criminal act. See,
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1985) (accomplice "aids or agrees or
attempts to aid" another in committing a criminal act); see also supra note 118. Under
Pinkerton, the affirmative act is that of conspiring to accomplish some criminal
purpose. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47.
It is also possible to characterize the blameworthy act in civil vicarious liability
as affirmative. Using tort law as an example, instead of censuring an employer for
failing to control an employee, one could hold the former liable based upon affirmative
conduct such as hiring an employee whom he knew required supervision or deciding
to maximize profits by eliminating the position of a supervisory who would have taken
steps to ensure that the harm did not ensue. See generally R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE,
supra note 6, at 911-13.
"Affiliative liability" is used to denote the general class of liability that
encompasses complicitous liability and Pinkerton liability. See infra notes 153-168
and accompanying text.
152. Both forms of affiliative liability require that the act be motivated by the
purpose of achieving other criminal ends. See, e.g., United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1938) (aiding and abetting implies a "purposive attitude" toward
commission of the target crime); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (conspirator
acts purposely to promote commission of target crime); id. § 2.06(3)(a) (accomplice
acts "with the purpose of promoting" the offense); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 7, at 536-37 (conspiracy requires intent to achieve target crime); W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTr, supra note 7, at 579-80 (accomplice liability requires purpose to bring about
commission of the target crime); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 697
(conspiracy requires "specific intent" to cause commission of a crime).
Civilly, vicarious liability can be based upon a finding of some fault, such as

recklessness or negligence, but it can also be predicated upon "strict liability," which
means no showing of fault is required for the imposition of liability. See, e.g., W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 250; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6,
at 911-13; W. PROSSER, supra note 143, § 69.
153. See supra note 149.
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that the affiliative act actually caused commission of certain crimes." 4 And

because the affiliative act is a wrong in itself, liability can attach even though
the target crime was not accomplished.' 5
To explain why causation is attenuated in this context, it is first necessary
Federal law
to identify the available categories of affiliative liability.

recognizes six varieties of affiliative liability:

(a) aiding and abetting

commission of a substantive offense; (b) attempting to aid and abet commission of a substantive offense; (c) aiding and abetting an attempt to commit a
substantive offense; (d) conspiring to commit a substantive offense; (e)
conspiring to aid and abet the commission of a substantive offense; and (f)
Pinkerton liability.5 6 Only the first and last categories require the commis-

154. See, e.g., Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402 (complicity has nothing "to do with the
probability that the forbidden result would follow upon the accessory's conduct");
Dressier, supra note 149, at 102-05; Kadish, supra note 125, at 357. The Pinkerton
facts illustrate the irrelevance of causation under that doctrine. Daniel was liable for
substantive offenses even though no evidence showed he "caused" them to be
committed. It was sufficient, according to Douglas, that the commission of those
offenses was a foreseeable consequence of Daniel's unlawful alliance with Walter. See
supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d
1210 (8th Cir. 1991) (offense was reasonably foreseeable). For a comparison of the
standards, see United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 118, 141;
infra note 158 and accompanying text.
If the agreement was to aid another to commit a crime or if it otherwise
encouraged the crime's commission, complicity would be established in the
commission of the substantive offense. It would be anomalous to hold that
conduct that would suffice to establish criminality, if something else is done
by someone else, is insufficient if the crime is never consummated.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 388 (1985) (footnote omitted).
156. See, e.g., supra note 122. Although the text does not discuss it as such,
conspiracy is also a form of affiliative liability. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.03 commentary at 386-93 (1985) ("sanction against group activity"). Federal law

recognizes various conspiracy offenses. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (general
conspiracy); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) (drug conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988)
(RICO conspiracy). Aside from conspiracy, the text and notes have addressed each
category of affiliative liability identified above except for conspiracy to aid and abet
the commission of a substantive offense. For cases on this type of activity, see United
States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990) (conspiracy to aid and abet
cocaine distribution); United States v. Frink, 912 F.2d 1413, 1416 (11th Cir. 1990)
(conspiracy to aid and abet possession of a controlled substance); United States v.
Nealy, 840 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1988) (conspiracy to aid preparation and presentation of
false tax returns); United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1015 (1980) (conspiracy to aid and abet bail jumping). One can be convicted
of conspiracy to aid and abet a substantive offense and aiding and abetting commission
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sion of a substantive offense as a condition for liability. They do so because
both categories are devices for imposing substantive liability upon one who
did not personally execute a substantive offense, but who somehow "caused"
it to be executed. 7 The four remaining categories do not require the
commission of a substantive offense as a condition for liability because they
are inchoate offenses; they reach conduct that is "designed to culminate in the
58
commission of a substantive offense" but has not actually done so.
Because the inchoate offense categories reach conduct prefatory to
commission of a substantive offense, they cannot require proof of a causal
nexus between a defendant's conduct and the commission of such an
offense.'59 Because the remaining two categories punish commission of a

of that substantive offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See, e.g., United States v.
Huber, 772 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kensil, 195 F. Supp. 115 (E.D.
Pa. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962).
Both the federal law and Model Penal Code recognize a separate offense of
"solicitation." See 18 U.S.C. § 211 (1988) ("solicitation to obtain appointive public
office"); 18 U.S.C. § 373 (1988) ("solicitation to commit a crime of violence"); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.02 (1985). Solicitation reaches conduct that would otherwise
represent "an attempt to conspire." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02 commentary at 365-66
(1985); see also Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 54-55

(1989). It is an offense only if the effort to convince another to commit a crime is
unsuccessful. See, e.g., id. at 29-34. Because it represents merely an "attempt to
affiliate" for criminal purposes, it is not considered as a separate category in the
discussion above. Id.
157. For a discussion of this issue see infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
158. Robbins, supra note 156, at 6. "Inchoate offenses allow punishment of an
actor even though he has not consummated the crime that is the object of his efforts."
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). The inchoate crimes are conspiracy, attempt and
solicitation. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.0 commentary at 387 (1985). There

are arguments for denoting conspiracy and attempt as substantive crimes. See id. ("the
prevalent view is that attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are substantive crimes in
that they proscribe a specific category of acts"). This Article, however, uses
"substantive offense" to denote a crime that is the target of an affiliative act such as
conspiracy oraiding and abetting. This convention preserves the conceptual distinction
between acts that sustain affiliative liability (e.g., conspiracy) and acts that are
themselves the goals of an affiliative undertaking (e.g., drug distribution). It also
conforms to federal practice.
At least one state distinguishes between "inchoate" and "choate" conspiracies.
See Comment, Wisconsin's Party to a Crime Statute, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 769, 790. In

this paradigm, "inchoate" conspiracies have not resulted in the commission of
substantive offenses, while choate offenses have produced the commission of a
substantive offense. Id. Pinkerton liability is, therefore, an example of "choate

conspiracy." See id.
159. See 2 E. DEVITr, C. BLAcKMAR & K. Q'MALLEY, supra note 119, § 21.03
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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substantive offense, they require proof of such a nexus. 16 But as they hold
defendants liable for offenses that are executed by someone else, neither can
insist on the direct causal relationship that is needed to hold one accountable
for her own acts. 161 Instead, they employ a compromise. In Pinkerton,
Justice Douglas cited a rule that was used to impute causation in mail fraud
cases as the basis for attributing causation among co-conspirators. 62 This
rule applied the common law test for calculating the scope of complicitous
liability to a particular context-offenses under the mail fraud statute. 63
Under the common law test, one was liable for another's criminal act if sh6
had somehow promoted commission of that act or if it was a "proximate
consequence" of acts she had promoted.' 64 One was not liable for acts that

(attempt). To convict for attempt in federal law, a jury must find that a defendant
intended to commit a particular substantive offense, and took a "substantial step"
toward its commission. See id; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985). Attempt
is an inchoate offense, which means it is "a prohibited act performed in anticipation
of committing" a substantive offense. Robbins, supra note 156, at n.3. If conduct that
would otherwise constitute an attempt matures into commission of a substantive
offense, the defendant will be charged with the substantive offense because the attempt
merges into it. See id. at 9. As noted above, conspiracy no longer merges into a
completed crime, so a defendant can be charged with conspiracy and the substantive
offense. See, e.g., Pinkerton,328 U.S. at 643 ("commission of the substantive offense
and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses").
160. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 306-313 (1985) (scope
of accomplice liability). Pinkerton implements this by requiring that substantive
offenses have been committed "in furtherance of the conspiracy" or have been
foreseeable "as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement."
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48.
161. Compare E. DEvrrT, C. BLACKMAR & K. O'MALLEY, supra note 119,
§ 28.10 (causation in Pinkerton liability) with, id. § 49.03 (causation in bank robbery)
and, id. § 43.03 (causation in perjury). See also id. at 717 ("Where the offense is...
a true crime, that is, where it involves moral delinquency or is punishable by
imprisonment or a serious penalty ... the doctrine of respondeat superior must be
repudiated."). See generally Sayre, supra note 103, at 719 ("Criminal liability in the
case of all true crimes should be based exclusively upon causation.").
162. See supra notes 70-79; see also Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (all who join a

scheme to defraud are responsible for any use of the mails in furtherance thereof). At
least one case used Pinkerton to impose liability on participants in a mail fraud
scheme. See United States v. Spudic, 795 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1986).
163. He who in any wise commands or counsels another to commit an unlawful
act, is accessory to all that ensues upon that unlawful act." 4 N. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 11, at 38. See also Sayre, supra note 103, at 694-701.
164. See supra section II(A) of this Article, pp 932-34; see also 1 J.BISHOP,
supra note 11, at 388 (one who combines with others to commit an unlawful act "has
the evil motive which justifies punishing him for any other resulting crime"); W.
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"could not have probably or naturally resulted from" efforts to commit a crime
she had facilitated or procured. 16s
Pinkerton imported the common law rule of imputed causation amongst
accomplices into !a new context--conspiracy. This is what led Justice
Rutledge to criticize the majority opinion as blurring the basic distinction
between substantive offenses, complicity and conspiracy; he regarded it as
implementing the paradox noted above by equating conspiracy with complici-

ty."c But in this he erred. Rather than melding conspiracy and complicity
CLARK, supra note 4, at 110 Qiable for all "probable consequences" of counseling an
unlawful act); Sayre, supra note 103, at 703-704.
165. Sayre, supra note 103, at 704-05 n.57 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 85 S.C.
146, 149-150, 67 S.E. 152, 154 (1910)). Accord W. CLARK, supra note 4, at 110 (not
liable if the act differs "from that counseled or commanded"); 1 F. WHARTON, supra
note 7, at 323-24 (act "must be the result and in execution of the confederacy"); see
also 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 11, at 392-93. Federal law uses this test to determine the
scope of complicitous liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Accord United States v.
Vaden, 912 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 1990) (liable for crimes "that are the natural or
probable consequence of the crime that he counseled, commanded, or otherwise
encouraged"); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982) (liable for
any crime that "was the natural or probable consequence of the crime that he advised
or commanded, although such consequence may not have been intended by him")
(quoting Russell v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1955)); United States
v. Jones, 517 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (accessory guilty of any "crimes
occurring as the 'natural and probable consequences' of the crime he himself
commits"); see also United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(liable for acts "'that are a natural and probable consequence of the criminal scheme
the accomplice encouraged or aided"') (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note
7, at 590). Justice Douglas referred to this test in Pinkerton. See Pinkerton,328 U.S.
at 647 ("The rule which holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands
another to commit a crime is founded on the same principle"-i.e., that members of
an illegal combination instigate commission of unlawful acts.).
166. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part) ("Without
the agreement Daniel was guilty of no crime.... With it and no more ... he was
guilty of two."). This perspective sees Pinkerton as violating what can be characterized as a principle of additive liability in criminal law: Conspiratorial liability is
imposed on those who agree to the commission of substantive offenses. Attempt
liability is imposed upon those who endeavor to commit such offenses but are
unsuccessful in doing so. Complicitous liability is imposed upon those who support
others who commit offenses or attempt to do so. Substantive liability is reserved for
those who successfully commit substantive offenses. Arguably, each type of liability
is based upon an additional increment of "badness," so that, for example, it is more
culpable to attempt to commit an offense than merely to agree to its commission.
Pinkerton critics contend that it ignores the principle of additive liability and
impermissibly equates the act of agreeing that an offense will be committed with (a)
successfully committing it and/or (b) providing aid and comfort to those who do so.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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so that the former becomes merely another means of aiding and abetting,
Pinkerton identified a new species of affiliative liability. While this variety
of affiliative liability probably existed prior to the Pinkerton opinion, Justice
Douglas gave it the imprimatur of the Supreme Court and, more importantly,
distinguished it from related doctrines, such as the evidentiary rule noted
above and the rule that allows the acts and declarations of conspirators to be
used as evidence against their colleagues in crime. 67
The liability recognized by Pinkerton is conceptually related to
complicity but rests upon a distinct factual premise. Before discussing the
extent to which they are related, it is helpful to review their factual differences.
Under Pinkerton, an agreement to commit a crime or crimes is a
prerequisite for liability. If such an agreement existed, anyone who joined it
is liable for offenses other conspirators commit to "further" the goals of their
agreement.'8 The act of agreeing to the commission of certain crimes
suffices; it is not necessary that one commit any affirmative act to advance the
realization of the goals of the conspiracy. 169 Complicity differs in two
respects. First, one can "aid and abet" the commission of a crime without
entering into an agreement to this effect. 70 Second, to incur aiding and

They argue that this outcome ignores basic conceptual distinctions among these
varieties of criminal liability and imposes double punishment for a single wrongful act.
167. See supra notes 107 & 113 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
169. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
170. Accord United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1088 (1976); see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (agreement

distinguishes conspiracy from aiding and abetting); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d
971 (11th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); (aiding and abetting does not
require proof of an agreement); United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 449 & n.9 (7th
Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Co-art, 595 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979)) (conspiracy
"requires proof of agreement, aiding and abetting does not"); United States v. Bright,
630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Krogstad, 576 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.
1978) (same); see also Perkins, The Act of One Conspirator,26 HASTINGs L.J. 337
(1974). Perkins gives the following example of complicity without conspiracy:
D... planned to murder X. Y ... sent a telegram to X to warn him....
A ... sent a telegram ... to prevent the delivery of Y's wire. And A's
telegram delayed Y's warning so that the latter ... was not delivered in
time, and X was murdered. A's complicity in X's murder is clear because
he gave important aid to D, but there was no conspiracy because D was not
even aware of the help he was receiving.
Id. at 340 (describing the facts of State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So.
722 (1894)). See generally Comment, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23
VA. L. REV. 898, 910 (1937).
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abetting liability, it is not sufficient to associate oneself with a criminal

act that is intended to
venture; it is also necessary to commit an affirmative
171
offense.
substantive
a
of
commission
the
advance
These differences in factual predicates mean that a course of conduct can
support liability under either doctrine.
But the same conduct cannot be
used to establish liability under both, as is illustrated by this example: X is
charged with conspiring to import illegal drugs into this country, with aiding
and abetting such importation, and with five substantive counts of distributing
illegal drugs. The charges are based on the following conduct: (a) on January
1, X agreed to join Y, Z, and A in importing and selling illegal drugs; (b) on
February 1, she rented a plane, which A used to bring a shipment of illegal
drugs into this country; (c) X did nothing else to further the goals of the
conspiracy but A, Y, and Z sold these drugs to "street dealers."

171. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. This element generates
permutations such as "conspiracy to aid and abet" and "aiding and abetting a
conspiracy." In the former, one agreed to commit an act that would advance the goals
of a criminal venture but never did; the agreement satisfies the requirement for
conspiratorial liability. However, complicitous liability cannot attach because she
committed no affirmative act to aid the success of that venture. See id; see also supra
note 146. Therefore, she can be charged with "conspiracy to aid and abet." One aids
and abets a conspiracy by taking some affirmative act to further the goals of that
conspiracy without, however, joining in the agreement that constitutes it. See, e.g.
supra note 146; see also United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1984)
(aiding and abetting a conspiracy).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1991)
(convictions proper under Pinkerton or an aiding and abetting theory); supra note 146;
see also supra notes 116-18. A course of conduct can be apportioned to impose both
Pinkerton and aiding and abetting liability. For example, Jane Doe joins a conspiracy
to conduct an illegal gambling venture. The venture operates for six months, during
which she notices that another conspirator, John Smith, is selling drugs to gambling
patrons. She sends patrons who ask about such drugs to Smith. The gambling
operation is discovered and all its members are arrested. Under Pinkerton,Jane Doe
is liable for substantive offenses that were committed by members of the gambling
conspiracy in furtherance of their agreement. Her liability extends to crimes other than
gambling. Assume, for example, that other members of the conspiracy killed a
gambling patron who had not been able to pay what he had lost. Because this criminal
act was a foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy Jane entered, she can be held
liable for it under Pinkerton. Neither she nor the other members of the gambling

conspiracy are liable under Pinkerton for drug offenses based upon John Smith's
conduct because this conduct was outside the scope of the conspiracy they joined.
Although Jane Doe did not enter into a separate drug conspiracy with John Smith, she
can be liable as an aider and abettor of drug offenses that he committed with her

assistance.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2

40

Brenner: Brenner: Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality
1991]

PINKERTON AND RICO

Under Pinkerton, X can be convicted of the five substantive counts
because they were committed by her co-conspirators within the scope of a

conspiracy that she joined prior to their commission.'

She can be

convicted of these offenses under a complicity theory because she associated
herself with a criminal venture and took an affirmative step-renting the
airplane-to advance achievement of its illegal designs. 174 Under either
theory, she can be convicted of the five substantive counts and conspiracy
because the latter is an offense separate from the substantive offense. 175 She
cannot, however, be convicted of the five substantive counts under both
theories because the same conduct is used to support liability under each
doctrine.
As explained earlier, federal accomplice liability requires that one
associate herself with a criminal venture and participate in efforts to achieve
its goals by committing some affirmative act to that purpose, while Pinkerton
liability requires that one join an agreement to accomplish certain criminal
ends.'7 6 X's act of joining the conspiracy would sustain Pinkerton liability
and is the act by which she associated herself with the criminal venture for
purposes of aiding and abetting liability.' 77 Renting the plane qualifies
either as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy or as "participation" that
would support liability for aiding and abetting the venture with which she
associated herself. Because an act in furtherance of a conspiracy is not
needed for Pinkerton liability, it seems that such liability can be a lesser
included offense of complicity.' 78
Here, Pinkerton liability is a lesser included offense of accomplice
liability because it is established by proving "less than all the facts required
to establish" accomplice liability. That is, if X had done nothing more than

173. The major difference between imputing liability in criminal law and vicarious
liability in civil law is that the latter allows liability to be imposed for prior "bad acts"
that one subsequently adopts, or "ratifies," while the former does not. See, e.g., Sayre,
supra note 103, at 708.
174. See supra notes 114 & 161 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Pinkerton,328 U.S. at 641 (Daniel and Walter Pinkerton were each
convicted of the substantive offenses plus conspiracy.). One can argue that this result
is improper because conspiracy is a lesser included offense of the substantive offenses;
it is the means by which the defendant "committed" those offenses. See infra note
180.
176. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.

177. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(conspiracy could as "evidence that the appellees aided and abetted" substantive
offenses); United States v. Whitehom, 710 F. Supp. 803, 850 (D.D.C. 1989) (same).
178. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(a) (1985) (one offense is included

in another when "it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish" the other offense); see also infra note 180.
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join the conspiracy, she would be liable for the substantive offenses under
Pinkerton but could not be convicted as an aider and abettor. Although
joining the conspiracy would qualify as associating herself with a criminal
venture, she committed no act of "participation." But Pinkerton liability will
not always be a lesser included offense of aiding and abetting because it is
possible to associate oneself with a criminal venture without joining in a
conspiratorial agreement.179 It is also important to remember that on these
facts, X could be convicted of the substantive offenses under either a
Pinkerton theory or a complicity theory and could also be convicted of
conspiracy. As noted earlier, conspiracy is a distinct offense, while complicity
is not. 80
Pinkerton and accomplice liability are different means for holding a party
liable for substantive offenses that were executed by someone with whom that
party shared an affiliative relationship. When identical conduct supports
liability under either principle, it is necessary to elect between them because,
as is explained in more detail below, they are merely different ways of finding
that an individual "committed" certain substantive offenses."8 1 To hold
otherwise would be to find that a defendant had committed the same offenses
twice, which would offend the prohibition against double jeopardy.1 8

179. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. At least one decision has
suggested that conspiracy can be a lesser included offense of substantive offenses for
which liability is imposed under a Pinkertontheory. See United States v. Marden, 872
F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1989) (no double jeopardy when conspirator is convicted of
a substantive offense under Pinkerton and convicted of conspiracy to commit that
offense); United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360, 1367 n.19 (5th Cir.), withdrawn in
part, 611 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980) (conspiracy a
lesser included offense of the Pinkerton vicarious liability offenses). Double jeopardy
commonly arises as to successive prosecutions, which are beyond the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., United States v. Edmond, 924 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Larkin,
605 F.2d at 1360-61.
181. It would be possible to develop yet another category, since Pinkerton does
not differentiate between "the defendant who was active in the substantive offenses and

the one who was not." United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1418 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Williams, J., concurring). Under Pinkerton,one who did no more than join a
conspiracy is exposed to the same liability as one who joined and actively participated
in the commission of substantive offenses. Since they clearly differ both in terms of
moral culpability and their respective potentials for "dangerousness," it might be
advisable to define a standard by which the former is subjected to a lesser quantum of
liability than the latter.
182. See U.S. CONsT. amend. v (no one "shall be... for the same offense...
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"). The prohibition prevents subsequent
prosecution for an offense following an acquittal of it, or a conviction for it, and
protects against multiple punishments for a single offense. See Brown v. Ohio, 432
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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Conceptually, both doctrines are devices for finding that an individual can
be deemed to have "committed" a substantive offense even though that person
183
was not present at its commission and did not physically consummate it.
The obstacle in this scenario is causation; though it may be possible to prove

the other elements of criminal liability,1"' it is extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, to prove that one person "caused" another's acts. In the example
above, did X "cause" the actions of Y, Z, and/or A? It would be possible to
prove (a) that X committed a voluntary act (or acts) with the purpose of
bringing about the commission of a crime, which is a prohibited social harm;
and (b) that such a crime, or harm, occurred. 18s But the crime was
physically perpetrated, in varying degrees, by Y, Z, and A. To hold X liable
for their conduct, it is necessary to articulate a concept that allows their acts
to be attributed to her without abrogating causation or any other elements of
criminal liability.lss

U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)
("where the same act" can constitute two offenses "the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 commentary at 10412 (1962) ("Conviction of both an offense and an 'included offense'. . . is barred by
the double jeopardy clause."). "[C]onviction of a lesser included offense bars
prosecution for the greater, and vice versa." See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
at 682 (1987); Brown, 432 U.S. at 161-62.
Some argue that Pinkerton violates the double jeopardy prohibition because it
imposes double punishment for a single wrongful act. The mere act of agreeing to the
commission of certain crimes allows one to be convicted of conspiracy and of any
substantive offenses committed as a proximate result of that agreement. This result
holds even if a conspiracy offense requires the commission of an overt act in
furtherance of the agreement as a condition of liability. Because a crime committed
by another conspirator qualifies as an overt act, a defendant can be convicted of
substantive offenses based upon conspiracy and of conspiracy based upon another's
committing substantive offenses. "ITlhis makes the former a lesser-included offense
within the latter, in violation ofBlockburger." Rosenberg,888 F.2d at 1419 (Williams,
J., concurring); see also Larkin, 605 F.2d at 1367.

183. This discussion assumes that Pinkerton and/or complicitous liability is
imposed on an individual rather than a collective and/or artificial entity. The
assumption is made to eliminate the cumbersome locutions that would be needed to
incorporate the imposition of liability upon such an entity.
184. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
185. See id.
186. Causation is the only issue in this example, as it is clear that X at all times
acted voluntarily and with the purpose of bringing about the commission of the target
crimes. Mens rea becomes an issue if crimes are committed that are outside the
criminal purposes that animated a particular actor. Both Pinkerton and complicity
attempt to resolve this issue by limiting liability to crimes that were a foreseeable
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Both the Pinkerton doctrine and rules of complicity accomplish this
through a single device: they attribute causation for crimes that are physically
perpetrated by another on the basis of a unique "bad act"-that of entering
into a criminal affiliation. The often-unarticulated premise of these doctrines
is that the act of aligning oneself with others to pursue a criminal purpose has

causal significance.'

The causal import of this act is an instance of

"mediate causation.""
"Mediate causation" denotes instances in which an
individual's actions can be deemed to have exerted some causal effect upon
another's conduct. 9 It resolves the problem of attempting to identify the
extent to which one person's acts actually affected another's conduct by
making it possible, under certain circumstances, to assume a causal effect that
is sufficient to support imposition of criminal liability.'9°

result of an affiliative act. See, e.g., Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48 (conspirators are
liable for acts that could be "reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence
of the unlawful agreement"); United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (accomplice liability "encompasses acts ... that are a 'natural and probable
consequence' of the criminal scheme the accomplice encouraged or aided") (citing W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 7, § 6.8, at 590).
For a dliscussion of imputing causation in accomplice liability, see, e.g., Dressier,
supra note 149, at 105-07; supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text; Kadish, supra
note 125.
187. In this they differ from the related doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy is
based upon the proposition that affiliating with others for criminal purposes is a "bad
act," but it makes this act a wrong in and of itself, without regard for any causal
consequences it may have. The explanation for this lies in the dual nature of
conspiracy. It is condemned both as an inchoate crime and because it poses the
"special danger" of concerted activity. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03
commentary at 387 (1962); supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
188. "Mediate" is used here as an antonym of immediate. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S,
supra note 132, at 1526 (mediate denotes "an intervening cause ... not direct or
immediate"). Outside this context, criminal law, like torts, insists that causal
relationships be "immediate." See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
189. The concept of mediate causation reflects the impossibility of analyzing
person-to-person causation in the objective fashion that can be used when causation

involves the interaction of two inanimate objects, the interaction of human beings and
inanimate objects or even the interaction of non-sentient animate objects. See, e.g.,
Kadish, supra note 125, at 360 (Sine qua non in the physical causation sense... does
not exist in... human actions .... "); see also infra note 190.
190.
[E]very volitional actor is a wild card; he need never
act in a certain way ....
It may be in a given case
that the principal would not have chosen to act
without the influence of the accomplice. But this is
never necessarily so, in the sense, for example, that
my tilting my chair [is] a necessary condition of its
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The circumstances that support this assumption implicate what Jerome
Hall called "causation by motivation."19' In "causation by motivation" one
does not personally commit a crime "but his conduct ... foreseeably

motivates another" to do so."9 Professor Hall primarily focused on instances in which one party supplies another with the motivation to commit a
criminal act by employing some form of coercion. 193 Although both are
instances of mediate causation, this version of "causation by motivation" is
broader than the variety that sustains Pinkerton and accomplice liability and
far less useful in the context from which they arose.
The differences between them can be illustrated by an example. Imagine
that an individual-the "prime mover"-wishes to induce certain others-the
"actors"-to commit a crime. In the version Professor Hall discussed, the
"actors" lack any motivation to commit the offense until they are influenced
by the "prime mover," who supplies them with the incentive to do so.
Assume the "actors" commit an offense in accordance with the desires of the
"prime mover." If the "prime mover" supplied their motivation in this regard
will have a defense and
by using coercive techniques, then the "actors" 194
mover."'
"prime
the
upon
imposed
be
will
liability

tipping over.
Kadish, supra note 125, at 360. Both Pinkerton liability and complicity doctrines
implement a "zero sum" approach to this issue, in that each only allows a finding of
liability or not-liability. Depending upon the rationale used to impose liability in either
context, it might be possible to develop gradations of liability that would more
accurately reflect the conduct at issue and the extent to which it may actually have
prompted commission of certain crimes. See generally Dressler, supra note 149, at
108-120 for a discussion of the rationales that support complicitous liability.
191. J. HALL, supra note 146, at 251, 270.

192. Id. Though noting that the concept encompasses complicity, Professor Hall
limited his consideration of it to instances in which "the immediate actor is not
criminally liable" because the offense "he committed is imputed to the coercer." Id.
at 272.
193. See id. at 273-78. For example, he examined cases in which one party,

using force or other duress, "caused" another to commit suicide. See id. at 273-74.
His purpose was to argue for a concept of "teleological causation." See id. at 278.
194. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 7, at 432-50 (duress and
necessity); R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note 6, at 1054-74 ("impelled perpetration"). If one commits a crime only because she was coerced to do so by another or
by circumstances beyond her control, the existence and operation of that coercion
absolves her from liability. J. HALL, supra note 146, at 272. This discussion assumes
that the "actors" know they are committing a crime. If they are induced to act but
remain ignorant of this circumstance, the "prime mover" would still be liable. See,
e.g., supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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This result follows because the "prime mover" was clearly the "but for"
cause of the offenses perpetrated by the "actors." "But for" his providing
them with the motivation to engage in criminal acts, they would not have done
so; he used other human beings as an instrument by which to commit
crimes.19 Because the "actors" merely implemented the "prime mover's"
criminal designs, it is proper to relieve them of liability and impose it only
upon him." 9

Human beings, however, unite to commit crimes far more often than they
become another's instrumentality for doing so. It is this circumstance which
the Pinkerton doctrine and rules of complicity address. Here, "causation by
motivation" operates in a more refined form. The Pinkerton doctrine and rules
of complicity both target the act of affiliating with another or others to
achieve a criminal purpose on the premise that this act reinforces and/or
exacerbates motivation that already exists on some level. 97 Because it
operates on a predisposition to engage in criminal conduct, the affiliative act
at issue in these doctrines cannot be a "but for" cause of any criminal
results. 98 It can, however, be a "contributing cause" of crimes that result
from such an affiliation. 199
A contributing cause is a force that combines with another cause to
produce a given result.'
The concept of "contributing cause" is not well-

195. See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 681 (1978) ("As
contrasted with merely aiding an existing criminal plan, instigation arguably satisfies
the 'but for' criteria of causation . . ").
196. J. HALL, supra note 146, at 272.
197. See, e.g., Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 ("Each conspirator instigated the
commission of the crime . . ").
198. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 125, at 343 ("If one.., encourages another to
commit a criminal act.., by giving him emotional support and approval.., one has
not caused the principal to act in the physical sense of cause ... for he was free to act
as he chose.").
199. See, e.g., Robinson, Imputed CriminalLiability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 633
(footnotes omitted) (1984) ("Even one who makes no direct contribution to the conduct
constituting the offense may be held criminally liable if he is... causally connected
to the act ... in the sense that he has created or helped create the situation in which
the offense occurs.").
200. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 6, at 782-85 (if two or more
join in committing "an unlawful act... the act of each... is... the act of both").
The federal complicity statute imposes liability for causing another's criminal acts, but
the concept of contributing cause has seldom been used in federal criminal law. See
supra note 38. But see United States v. Maselli, 534 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1976)
(statute encompasses acts that "contribute to the commission of offenses"). And
though it is used in state prosecutions, such cases involve causation due to the
operation of objective forces, rather than the type of causation that is discussed in the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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developed in criminal law for two reasons. One is that criminal law requires
a closer fit between cause and effect than tort law does.2 1 The other is that
law has historically employed a "mechanical" approach to causation that
emphasizes the operation of objective forces and effectively ignores subjective
causation. 202
In analyzing "causation by motivation," Professor Hall
attempted to introduce subjective causation into criminal law without
abrogating the requirement that there be a demonstrably linear relationship
between an act and a criminal result. It is possible to achieve this in instances
in which one person's will supplants another's to become the "but for" cause
of a criminal act. It is, however, impossible to achieve this when subjective
causation is considered as an additive, rather than an overriding, force; this,
of course, is the phenomenon that both the Pinkerton doctrine and rules of
complicity address.
Both doctrines are based upon a realization that the act of affiliating with
others for criminal purposes can be a contributing cause of subsequent
criminal acts by bolstering motivation that already existed and/or by making
it more difficult to withdraw from the criminal venture that produced those
acts. It is likely to be extraordinarily difficult or even impossible to
demonstrate the extent to which a particular affiliative act actually "caused"
commission of given criminal act. Therefore, both use generic categories of
affiliation as the basis for what is at least an inference, and at most a
presumption, of an attenuated form of "causation by motivation" which will
be referred to as "causation by affiliation." "Causation by affiliation" is an
instance of mediate causation arising from an affiliation between persons who
were privy to the commission of criminal acts. It applies to situations in which
it is not possible to demonstrate that one person was the "but for" cause of
another's criminal conduct. It attributes causation to non-actors on the basis
of their having affiliated themselves with the actors. The affiliations are those
that have been determined, with at least an intuitively high confidence level,

text. See, e.g., State v. Bartlett, 355 S.E.2d 913, 916 (W. Va. 1987) ("The term
contributing cause.., means that the Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol was one of the precipitating causes for the accident.");
see also State v. Berger, 108 Ariz. 396, 499 P.2d 152 (1972) (prior injuries as
contributing cause of death); In re Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 481 N.Y.S.2d 675,
471 N.E.2d 447 (1984) (purse snatching as a contributing cause of deaths by heart
attack); Anderson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 630, 252 S.W.2d 189 (1952) (sufficient if
wound inflicted by pocket knife was a contributing cause of death).
201. See supra note 140. For the tort law consequences of joint causes, see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 432, 433, 433(A), 435, 439-40 (1976).
202. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 125, at 360. Recognition of this led Professor
Hall to argue for a concept of "teleological causation." See J.HALL, supra note 137,
at 273 ("there is no a priorireason why causation by giving an incentive should not
receive wider recognition in the criminal law").
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to bear a significant potential for inducing others to engage or persist in
criminal activity. For Pinkerton,the affiliative act is agreeing that crimes will
be committed; for complicity, the affiliative act can take various forms as long
as it reliably evinces a desire to support the commission of criminal acts.
C. RICO -Overview
Before 1970, prosecutors relied on conspiracy charges to join large numbers
of defendants in a single trial and to obtain convictions based upon weak
circumstantial evidence.? 3
Since 1970, prosecutors have increasingly relied on charges under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, commonly known as
"RICO," as a superior means of achieving the advantages traditionally
associated with conspiracy charges. 2 4 RICO was enacted as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.205 Prompted by the concern that
swept this country during the 1950's and 1960's," 6 the Act sought to
eradicate organized crime by creating "enhanced sanctions and new remedies"
to be used against it.20 7 RICO was one of three offenses created by the Act,
the remaining titles of which attempted to improve the government's ability
to investigate crime and enhanced the sanctions that could be imposed on
offenders. 2 s Its legislative history suggests RICO was meant to be used

203. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darlingof the Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORDHAM
L. REv. 165, 167-68 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
204. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, RacketeerInfluenced& CorruptOrganizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal& Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1011

(1980) (footnote omitted).
205. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX,
§ 901(a), 84 Stat. 941. (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). RICO is codified
under the following sections and headings, all of which appear in title 18 of the U.S.
Code:
§ 1961-Definitions; § 1962-Prohibited activities; § 1963-Criminal
Penalties; § 1964-Civil remedies; § 1965-Venue and process; § 1966-Expedition
of actions; § 1967-Evidence; § 1968-Civil investigative demand.
206. "The hearings that preceded the Act... led to a nationwide fear that our
society's basic institutions were being eroded by this evil force. The popular reaction
was not unlike the 'red scares' that swept the nation in the 1920s and again in the
1950s." Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65
IOWA L. REv. 837, 837 (1980) (footnotes omitted). See also supra § II(B)(2) of this

article, pp. 959-61.
207. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922.
See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 204, at 1014-21.
208. RICO was Title IX of the Act; Title VIII defined a gambling offense and
Title XI concerned illegal uses of explosives. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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against organized criminals who infiltrate and capture legitimate businesses,
but it has not been restricted to this context.' ° It has been used against a
wide variety of individuals and entities, many of whom have no connection
with the activity that ostensibly led to its enactment.21
Though many
express concern about this expansive use of the statute, others defend it as
implementing Congress' desire that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate
its remedial purposes."21' Despite reservations about how it is used, even
RICO's critics concede that it is uniquely adapted for use in a variety of
factual contexts.

576, 589 (1981). For the Act's other provisions, see Bradley, Racketeering and the
Federalizationof Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV 213, 255-57 (1984).
209. In the early years of RICO jurisprudence, Barry Tarlow noted that most
defendants "could not conceivably be included within the traditional or newly
expanded definitions of organized crime." Tarlow, supra note 203, at 170 (footnotes
omitted). It has been used against "defendants who committed three robberies, a
defendant who defrauded Medicare through his hospital supply business, and a group
who operated a 'weekend dice and card game' in a trailer park." Bradley, supra note
206, at 257 (footnotes omitted). See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 204, at 1013 n.15
("Organized Crime Control Act was not limited to . . .'organized crime"); see also
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 204, at 1011-12; Blakey & Perry, An Analysis of the
Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform:
"Motherof God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860-68 (1990);
Dennis, CurrentRICO Policies of the Department ofJustice, 43 VAND. L REV. 651,
653-54 (1990) (used against corruption and white-collar crimes). Some do not agree
that RICO was meant to target organized crime. Cf.Coffey, The Selection, Analysis,
and Approval ofFederalRICO Prosecutions,65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1035 (1990)
("spectacular successes against organized crime").
210. For discussions of this issue, see, e.g., Califa, RICO Threatens Civil
Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1990); Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled
Wall Street, 65 NoTRE DAME L. RE. 1050 (1990); Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO

Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV.691 (1990); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291,
298-300 (1983); cf.Blakey & Perry, supra note 209, at 868-924.
RICO was used very little during the first decade of its existence. See, e.g.,
Dennis, supra note 209, at 652-53. But in "1983 and 1984 an explosion of RICO
cases occurred that is still being felt." Id. at 653. RICO supports both civil and
criminal actions. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
211. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, § 904,
84 Stat. 947. For critiques of this approach, see sources cited supra note 210. For a
defense, see Blakey & Gettings, supra note 204, at 1031-33; Coffey, supra note 209,
at 1049 ("Congress has mandated that RICO be liberally construed"); Note, RICO and
the Liberal ConstructionClause, 66 CoRNELL L. REV. 167 (1980).
212. See generallyTarlow, supra note 210, at 293-302; other sources cited supra
note 210.
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Its flexibility results from a novel conception of criminal
behavior-"enterprise criminality.2 1 3
Though sometimes construed as
synonymous with "organized crime," "enterprise criminality" properly denotes
criminal activity occurring "in the context of an organization," which can be
a corporation, a Mafia family, or almost anything in between.214 RICO
authorizes both criminal sanctions and civil remedies for such activity. 5
One who has been criminally convicted of violating RICO can be
punished by a fine, imprisonment for up to twenty years or life, or by both a
fine and imprisonment.1 6 Offenders can also be required to forfeit any
property acquired or maintained by means of a RICO violation." Anyone
whose "business or property" was injured by a violation has a civil remedy;
RICO victims can file suit in federal court and seek treble damages plus costs
and attorneys' fees.
These sanctions are triggered by conduct that is remarkably straightforward when considered in the abstract. To violate RICO, a "person" must do
one of the following as to an "enterprise" that engages in or affects interstate
or foreign commerce: (a) acquire or maintain an interest in it; (b) acquire or
maintain control of it; (c) establish it; (d) operate it; or (e) conduct or
participate in the conduct'of its affairs.219 "Person" and "enterprise" are
terms of art: a RICO "person" is an "individual or entity capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property."" 0 The "enterprise" is an

213. See, e.g., Blakey &Gettings, supra note 204, at 1013-14 (RICO created new
"remedies for all types of organized criminal behavior, that is, enterprise criminality").
214. Note, Functionsof the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV.

646, 649 n.12 (1989) (citing United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984)).
215. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988). Life imprisonment is available when "the
violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes
life imprisonment." Id.
217. Id. § 1963(a)-(b).
218. Id. § 1964(c). The statute also creates civil remedies available to the
government. See id. § 1964(a).
219. See id. § 1962(a)-(c). Under § 1962(a), it is an offense to "use or invest,
directly or indirectly," income derived from racketeering or collection of unlawful debt
to acquire an interest in, or establish or operate an enterprise. The section 1962(b)
offense is using such income "to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly" an interest
in or control of an enterprise. The section 1962(c) offense is using racketeering or
collection of unlawful debt to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of"' the enterprise's affairs. The section 1962(d) conspiracy offense is
discussed infra notes 239-243 and accompanying text.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988). The categories are merely illustrative, as the
definition says that person "includes" these entities. See Blakey & Gettings, supra
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2

50

Brenner: Brenner: Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality

1991]

PINKERTON AND RICO

"individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity". 1 RICO reaches "illegal" as well as "legal" enterprises. In United
States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court held that a group of persons "associated
in fact" for purely illegal purposes can constitute a RICO enterprise.'m The
Court found that an "association in fact" can be an "enterprise" even though
it exists for no purpose other than the commission of unlawful acts.23
A "person" violates RICO by using either the collection of unlawful debt
or a pattern of racketeering activity to engage in the activities listed
above.'
"Unlawful debt" is the result of illegal gambling or "loan5
This option is seldom used. 6 Most RICO -actions accuse
sharking."
defendant(s) of using a pattern of racketeering activity to engage in the
The "pattern of racketeering activity" requires
proscribed activities. '
commission of "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within ten years of
each other, excluding "any period of imprisonment. "' 8 "Racketeering
activity" is defined by incorporating conduct prohibited by state and other
federal statutes. Under 18 U.S.C. section 1961(1)(A); it is "any act or threat

note 204, at 1022-23.
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). This definition "includes" these entities. "Here,
too, the definition works by illustration, not by limitation." Blakey & Gettings, supra

note 204, at 1023 (footnote omitted). It is possible for the "person" and "enterprise"
to be the same. The generally accepted view is that they must be distinct for actions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), but need not be under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) or (b)
(1988). For cases involving section 1962(c), see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank
& Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), affd on othergrounds, 473 U.S. 606

(1985) (separation required); cf. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-90 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983) (separation not required). For cases
under sections 1962(a) and (b), see Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884
F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1989); Petro-Tech Inc. v. The Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir.
1987); Medallion TV Enter., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D.
Cal. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989).
For a critique of cases in which both are a single individual, see Tarlow, supra note

210, at 344-45 ("an absurd notion"). They are usually alleged as distinct entities. See
generally, Note, Functions ofthe RICO EnterpriseConcept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
646, 664-69 (1989); J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDsTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRiMINAL LAW
AND STRATEGY § 5.09[4] (1991).
222. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).

223. Id. at 583.
224. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1988).
226. See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 210, at 370-71.

227. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
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involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year." The remainder of section 1961(1) assimilates a "laundry list"
of federal offenses as "racketeering activity.""
Under the statute, a "pattern" exists if a person commits two acts of
"racketeering activity" within ten years of each other.2 0 In Sedima v. Imre.x
Co., Inc.,23 1 the Supreme Court held that "continuity plus relationship"
232 It returned to the
between racketeering acts is needed for a "pattern."
33
Telephone.
Bell
issue in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan parsed Sedima. 4 He held that
"relationship" exists if racketeering acts "have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission" or are otherwise
interrelated and not isolated.25s As to "continuity," he held that it denotes
either "a closed period of repeated conduct" or conduct that poses a danger of

repetition.2

Though not a model of clarity, Hi., Inc. is the present

standard for identifying patterns of racketeering activity in RICO actions. 1 7
RICO creates three substantive offenses, but the majority of actions
alleging substantive violations are brought under section 1962(c), which
prohibits using a pattern of racketeering activity to conduct or participate in
conducting the affairs of an enterprise.2s The other widely-used provision

229. See id. § 1961(1)(B)-(E). The federal offenses include bribery (id. § 201),
counterfeiting (id. §§ 471-473), embezzling pension and welfare funds (id. § 664), mail
and wire fraud (id. §§ 1341, 1343), obscenity (id. § 1461-1465), obstruction of justice
(id. §§ 1503, 1510-1513), interference with commerce (id. § 1951), money laundering
(id. §§ 1956-1957), and labor offenses, bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, federal drug
offenses and violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. See
id. § 1961(1).
230. See, e.g., supra note 228 and accompanying text.
231. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
232. Id. at 497 n.14.
233. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
234. Id. at 237-38. Under RICO, the offenses that define "racketeering activity"
are known as "predicate offenses." See Coffey, supra note 209, at 1036 (18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1988) "cites as predicate statutes fifty-two other federal statutes... federal
labor and securities laws, and nine state offenses").
235. HJ., Inc., 492 U.S. at 239 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1988)).
236. Id. at 241.
237. For critiques of the opinion, see Note, "Motherof Mercy-Is This the End
of Rico?", 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990); Dennis, supra note 209, at 653-55.
238. See supra note 219; J.RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, at 1-36;
see also Tarlow, supra note 210, at 324.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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is section 1962(d), which makes it an offense to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C.
section 1962(a), (b), or (c).
RICO conspiracies are a matter of ambiguity. Many courts hold that the
offense occurs with the agreement to commit substantive violations; others
also require an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.2 9 The agreement
is also a source of confusion. In most circuits, a defendant merely needs to
agree that some member(s) of the conspiracy will commit substantive
violations. 4 Some, however, require that the defendant personally agree
to commit such violations.241 Conspirators must agree to use a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt to engage in activities
prohibited by section 1962(a), (b) or (c).242 There is no merger under the
statute, so one can be convicted of both conspiracy and substantive offenses;
cumulative penalties can be imposed in accordance with Congress' desire to
impose enhanced sanctions on organized crime.243
RICO did not add to the categories of prohibited conduct; the conduct
that supports RICO charges was already defined as illegal by other statutes. 2 " RICO attempts to strike at "organized crime" by attacking the

structures within which it flourishes.24 To that end, RICO prohibits using

239. See, e.g., United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1991) (no
overt act required); United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,475
U.S. 1128 (1986) (same); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
1983) (overt act required); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982) ("some overt action" required).
240. See Pryba v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 305, 306, denying cert. to 900 F.2d
748 (4th Cir. 1990) (White, J.,dissenting); see also Comment, Clarifying RICO's
Conspiracy Provision:Personal Commitment Not Required, 62 TuL. L. REV. 1399

(1988).
241. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1341 n.64 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 S. Ct. 1005 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d
1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); see also Comment,
supra note 240.
242. See, e.g., J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, § 1.04[4].
243. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (20-year consecutive sentences for convictions under
§ 1962(c) & (d)). See 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINALLIABILrrY 292-93 (1984);
see also infra note 287 and accompanying text.
244. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 204, at 1021 n.71.
245. See Note, supra note 221, at 650-53. "Criminalizing" organized crime
entailed "'defining illicit business in organizational terms"' and making "'participation
in such divisions of labor a violation of criminal law."' Id. at 652 (quoting Cressy,
The Functionsand Structureof CriminalSyndicates, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
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otherwise-proscribed conduct to have some "impact" on an organization, or
'
The
"enterprise. 246 The organization can be "legal" or purely "illegal."247
"impact" is one of the activities proscribed by section 1962.24
RICO makes it a federal crime to commit certain crimes within an
organizational configuration. If these offenses are committed outside such a
configuration, RICO does not apply and they must be prosecuted as discrete
offenses. If committed in this context, however, they support criminal charges
and/or civil actions under RICO.
I.

CAN PINKERTON LIABILTY BE ENFORCED IN RICO ACTIONS? 24 9

Pinkerton defines an affiliative liability that is generally enforced in
federal criminal law.250 RICO is a federal statute that imposes criminal and
civil liability for criminal activity occurring within an organization, or
"enterprise."2 5' Because federal criminal law generally imposes Pinkerton
liability, it seems such liability should also apply to RICO actions.
Unfortunately, this issue has yet to be resolved. Pinkerton has been cited
and even applied on occasion, but no cases analyze the permissibility of using
Pinkerton liability under RICO. 52 No law review articles have tackled this

ORGANIZED CRIME 57 (1967)). Cressy argued that this approach was needed because
aside from conspiracy, there was no means of attacking those who used a division of
labor to perpetrate crimes. See Cressy, supra.
246. See supra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. In other words, "impact" is
establishing an organization, acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of it,
operating it or conducting its affairs by prohibited means.
249. This section considers whether it is doctrinally permissible to enforce

Pinkerton liability in RICO actions. It does not address the advisability of doing so.
250. See supra Section II(B)(2) of this article, pp. 959-67.
251. See supra Section II(C) of this article, pp. 980-85.
252. Pinkerton was used in United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.
1990). In Caliendo, the defendants were charged with RICO conspiracy and with
twenty-six counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988). Id. at 431.
Each was convicted of the conspiracy and of several Travel Act counts. Id. Over
objections, the trial court gave a Pinkerton instruction that allowed the jury to use
defendants' membership in the RICO conspiracy as the basis for imposing substantive
liability under the Travel Act counts. Id. at 439 n.7. In her appeal, one defendant
challenged this instruction, arguing that using Pinkerton in connection with RICO
conspiracy "resulted in an unwarranted extension of criminal liability." Id. at 439
(citing United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,479 U.S. 939
(1986)). The Seventh Circuit rejected her argument because it found the evidence was
sufficient to support her conviction on the Travel Act counts. "In light of this.., we
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question, 3 and though the Justice Department has a rule of restraint in this
regard, it seems to reflect prudential considerations rather than a determination
as to the substantive impermissibility of imposing Pinkertonliability in RICO
prosecutions.2 As long as this rule is in force, it is unlikely that any court
will have occasion to address Pinkerton's enforceability under RICO.2 5

fail to see how the Pinkerton instruction jeopardized any evidentiary determinations
made by the jury." Id. at 439.
The case cited in Caliendo is Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 504-05 n.7 ("restraint
[should] be applied with regard to Pinkerton in this context). For a recent Seventh
Circuit decision, see United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437-38 (7th Cir. 1991).
Campione is discussed infra note 266. For other cases dealing with Pinkerton and
RICO, see United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1147 n.91 (3d Cir. 1990) (no
"Pinkerton problem" with instructions in criminal RICO case); United States v.
Campione, No. 89 CR 166 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database)
("not legally incorrect to use" a Pinkerton instruction in a RICO case); Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161Z (W.D. Wash. May 5, 1989)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (plaintiffs "have not provided any case in which the
Pinkerton doctrine was applied under RICO § 1962(c) to hold a RICO defendant
chargeable with a predicate offense of a co-conspirator, even if he did not specifically
enter into a conspiracy to commit that particular act, and this Court has found none");
United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279,
335 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986) ("culpability under § 1962(c) has been established... underPinkerton,by the
conduct of their co-conspirators").
253. Two articles analyze "vicarious liability" in RICO actions, but neither
considered Pinkerton as a means of imputing liability for substantive offenses. See
Dwyer & Kiely, Vicarious CivilLiability under the RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt
OrganizationsAct,21 CALIF. W.L. REV. 324 (1985); Note, JudicialEffortsto Redirect
an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate
Liability, 65 B.U.L. REV. 561 (1985). As was explained earlier, Pinkerton is not a rule
of vicarious liability. See supra Section II(B)(2) of this Article pp. 961-66. Another
article has examined the related issue of enforcing accomplice liability under RICO.
See Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability for Civil Violationsof RICO, 61 TEMP.
L. REV. 1481 (1988).
254. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS 73-74 (1985) ("the combination of RICO and Pinkerton could lead to
unwarranted extensions of criminal liability"). This policy, of course, accounts for the
fact that there is functionally no case law on the use of Pinkerton liability in RICO
actions. See also infra note 264 & 266 and accompanying text; cf. Neapolitan, 791
F.2d at 505 (government argued for Pinkerton liability in RICO case).
255. Although the Justice Department's policy does not bind civil RICO litigants,
it is at least arguable that the contours of civil RICO cases are shaped by the concepts
utilized in RICO prosecutions. See generally Dwyer & Kiely, supra note 253, at 325
(RICO "impose[s] civil liability for criminal acts").
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This matter, however, should be resolved. Even if the Justice Department
persists in its policy of restraint, Pinkerton liability can become an issue in
civil actions; also, the resolution of this issue may provide insights into the
role of affiliative liability in federal criminal law.2 6
For these reasons, the remainder of this Article endeavors to resolve the
extent to which it is doctrinally acceptable to enforce Pinkerton liability in
RICO cases. Section A analyzes objections that can be made to using
Pinkerton under RICO and considers how it can be used in RICO prosecutions
if these objections are overcome. Section B examines the doctrine's use in
civil RICO cases.
A. CriminalRICO
RICO is primarily a criminal statute, though it includes a civil remedy for
victims of the activities it proscribes. 7 As a criminal statute, it imposes
both substantive and conspiratorial liability.2 8 This liability can be coupled
with liability for the predicate offenses, commission of which give rise to
substantive RICO liability.5 9 The as-yet unresolved issue is whether the
Pinkerton doctrine can be used to impose liability for substantive RICO
violations upon one who agreed to their commission but was not personally
involved in their execution.
1. Objections
The critical inquiry in resolving this issue is whether there is any
doctrinal reason not to enforce Pinkerton liability in RICO cases. RICO
creates four distinct offenses-a RICO conspiracy and three substantive
offenses.
The question is, then, "is there any principled reason why the
affiliative act that gives rise to Pinkerton liability as to other substantive
offenses in federal criminal law should not also do so with regard to RICO
offenses?"
This question can be answered by analyzing two related issues: (1)
whether other forms of affiliative liability apply under RICO; and (2) whether
Pinkerton liability is enforced under statutes that are analogous to RICO in

256. For instances in which this issue has arisen in civil RICO litigation, see infra
pp. 1007-10.

257. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 980-81.
258. See, e.g., 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 243, at 293 (defendant can be punished

"for both conspiring to commit and for committing substantive RICO violations").
259. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 982-83 (explanation of predicate
offenses); see diso K. BRicKEY, supra note 243, at 313-14.
260. See supra section 1(C) of this Article, pp. 981-83.
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their purpose and effect. If other types of affiliative liability do not apply
under RICO, and/or Pinkerton liability is not imposed under RICO analogues,
then there may be a doctrinal impediment to using affiliative liability under
RICO. If other types of affiliative liability do apply under RICO, and
Pinkerton liability is imposed under analogous statutes, however, then there
must be no doctrinal obstacle to enforcing Pinkerton liability in RICO
prosecutions.
As to the applicability of affiliative liability, an earlier section demonstrated that Pinkerton liability is conceptually akin to liability for complicity,
a form of affiliative liability that is often referred to as "aiding and abetting"
the commission of an offense.26 Because complicity is a form of affiliative
liability, if it applies to RICO actions the statute cannot contain an innate bar
to incorporating at least the general concept of affiliative liability in its
enforcement.' 2
As a recent case noted, "[i]t is beyond dispute that a RICO conviction
may rest upon the defendant's aiding and abetting of charged predicate
offenses."'
Aiding and abetting a predicate offense is, in effect, the

261. See supra section II of this Article, pp. 970-78.
262. Although the aiding and abetting liability defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)
routinely applies to federal offenses, two cases have held that it does not apply to an
offense the structure of which is analogous to RICO. See infra note 274; see also
United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1989) ("No cases other than
Amen andBenevento hold section 2(a) totally inapplicable to a federal criminal statute
.... "). Because, however, this has been recognized as a possibility under a very
similar statute, the issue is addressed in the text above.
One can argue that RICO is itself a form of affiliative liability in that its
proscriptions only attach to conduct that occurs within an organizational context. If
RICO does require an "affiliation" as a prerequisite for incurring liability under its
substantive or conspiracy provisions, then one can argue that the imposition of
Pinkerton liability would impermissibly impose double punishment for a single act of
affiliation. See, e.g., United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 504-05 n.7 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 940 (1986) ("Given that implicit within the compound
nature of RICO is a concept of punishment for substantive offenses, the commission
of which was agreed to by the defendant, it is difficult to see why the government
needs to invoke a second cumulative punishment device in the form of Pinkerton"
liability.); see also infra note 266 and accompanying text.
263. United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1132 n.68 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
United States v. Rasteli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 515
(1989)); United States v. Wyatt, 807 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 858 (1987); United States v. Quaod, 777 F.2d 1105, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 569 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d
1322, 1339-41 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); see also Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 904(b), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (RICO does not "supersede any
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commission of such an offense. '4 Because aiding and abetting is a form of
affiliative liability and because it supports imposition of substantive criminal
RICO liability, there is no categorical impediment to using affiliative liability
in RICO cases. This suggests that Pinkerton liability may be permissible
under RICO. Indeed, the use bf complicitous liability in RICO actions
indicates that general federal criminal doctrines can apply under the statute,
which at least inferentially supports using the Pinkerton doctrine in this
context.
Though RICO's use of complicity establishes its tolerance for one type
of affiliative liability, the crucial question is whether this tolerance extends to
the type of affiliative liability imposed by the Pinkerton doctrine. It may be
that the unique structure of RICO presents some impediment to its use of
Pinkerton liability. One way to determine the existence of such an impedimient is to examine an analogous statute. If Pinkerton liability is enforced
under an analogous statute, there should be no reason why it cannot be
enforced under RICO; conversely, if Pinkerton liability is not enforced under
a RICO analogue, this suggests that these statutes may be innately intolerant
to this type of liability.
Before undertaking this analysis, it is necessary to clarify what would
constitute an impediment to using Pinkerton liability in this context.
Pinkertonimposes liability for substantive offenses based upon the affirmative
act of agreeing to the commission of those and/or related offenses. 265 The
"bad act" that triggers substantive liability is the act of affiliating with another

provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties ... in addition

to those" it creates.). A RICO conspiracy charge can be based upon an agreement to
aid and abet the commission of substantive RICO offenses. See, e.g., Rastelli, 870
F.2d at 831-32; Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1339-41. See generally United States v. Jones,
678 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1982) (18 U.S.C. § 2 "is applicable to the entire [federal]
criminal code").

264. See generally cases cited supra note 263. See also J. RAKOFF & H.
supranote 221, at 12-27. Conduct which would render one an "accessory
after the fact" in traditional complicity parlance also qualifies as a RICO predicate.
See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1530 n.34 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986); see also supra section II(C) of this Article, p. 982.
265. See supra section 11(B) of this Article, pp. 970-74. As explained earlier,
under Pinkerton one incurs liability for substantive offenses by joining a conspiracy
that contemplates the commission of those or similar offenses. See id. Liability is
imposed both for the substantive offenses and for conspiracy as a separate offense.
If Pinkerton liability applies under RICO, it would operate as follows: proof that one
had joined a RICO conspiracy, which is a conspiracy that contemplates commission
of substantive RICO offenses, would permit imposition of criminal liability for
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988), and for any substantive RICO offenses
committed in furtherance and/or as a foreseeable consequence of that conspiracy.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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or others for criminal purposes; under Pinkerton,one is held to the foreseeable

consequences of such a criminal bargain.
The imposition of Pinkerton liability will not be permissible under RICO
if RICO itself imposes liability for the act of agreeing to the commission of
substantive offenses. If RICO does this, then enforcing Pinkerton liability in
RICO prosecutions would impose double liability for a single "bad act" of
criminal affiliation. One court has suggested that this is a reason for not
enforcing Pinkerton liability under RICO:
Unlike a "standard" conspiracy, a section 1962(d) conspiracy provides for
enhanced penalties based, at least in part, on involvement in the predicate
crimes defining the conspiracy. Thus, a RICO conspiracy is ... a
cumulative punishment device, allowing for penalties a quantum harsher
than those for other conspiracies. Given that complaint with the compound
value of RICO is a concept of punishment for substantive offenses ... it
is difficult to see why the government needs to invoke a second cumulative
punishment device in the form of Pinkerton [liability]. 6
Although this court did not suggest that Pinkerton liability cannot be used
under RICO, its comments raise valid concerns about the imposition of this
type of affiliative liability in the context of complex federal criminal statutes.
Before addressing the extent to which these concerns are valid with regard to
RICO, it is useful to consider whether Pinkerton liability is enforced under a
statute the structure and operation of which is analogous to RICO.
Its closest analogue is the "Continuing Criminal Enterprise" statute-21
U.S.C. section 848-which RICO architect G. Robert Blakey has described as
"RICO's sister provision. , 267 The Continuing Criminal Enterprise, or CCE,

266. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 504-05 n.7 (government argued for Pinkerton
liability in RICO case). The court was careful to note that Pinkerton liability is not
forbidden under RICO: "This is not to say that the use of Pinkerton instructions in
RICO conspiracy cases is 'wrong or improper' but only to caution that restraint be
applied with regard to Pinkerton in this context." Id. In United States v. Campione,
942 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit construed Neapolitan as holding that
the "use of Pinkerton instructions in RICO conspiracy cases is not 'wrong or
improper."' Id. at 437 (quoting Neopolitan, 791 F.2d at 505 n.7). The Campione
instruction told the jury that if it found a defendant guilty of participating in a RICO
conspiracy, then it could also find that dbfendant guilty of substantive Travel Act
offenses committed pursuant to that conspiracy. Id. at 437-38.
267. Blakey & Perry, supra note 209, at 967 n.380. CCE has been called "the
RICO drug statute." Comment, Constitutionalitywithout Wisdom: Caplin & Drysdale
and Monsanto Examined, 17 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 659,663 & n.42 (1990). Like
RICO, CCE was enacted in 1970 as part of a concern with organized crime. See, e.g.,
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 782-86 (1985) (discussing CCE and its
legislative history); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148-51 (1977) (same);
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statute makes it a federal crime to "engage[] in a continuing criminal
A "continuing criminal enterprise" is the commission of a
enterprise".2
"continuing series" of drug felonies "in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom" one "occupies a position of organizer, a
and "from which
supervisory position, or any other position of management"
' 9
such person obtains substantial income or resources. n2
The Supreme Court has held that CCE is a conspiracy offense because
"conviction would be impossible unless concerted activity were present."2 "0
As with RICO conspiracies, CCE is "greater" than simple conspiracy so one
can be acquitted on a CCE charge and still be convicted of conspiracy under
another federal statute. 27' Like RICO offenses, CCE is distinct from its

predicates, so one can be convicted and punished for both. 2'

Punishment

Comment, supra, at 662-664. CCE was enacted by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 146 n.12.
268. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1) (1988).
269. Id. § 848(b). See also infra note 284. A CCE "series" includes three or more
felony drug offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985). The penalty is imprisonment for from 20
years to life plus a fine of up to $100,000 and forfeiture of all profits and property
obtained as a result of the offense. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(1) (1988).
270. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148 (1977).
Section 848(b)(2)(A) restricts the definition of the crime to a continuing
series of violations undertaken by the accused in concert with five or more
Even if § 848 were read to require individual
other persons ....
agreements between the leader of the enterprise and each of the other five
necessary participants, enough would be shown to prove a conspiracy ....
Id.
271. See United States v. Graewe, 774 F.2d 106,108 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1068-69 (1986). Conspiracy offenses under state and federal law are RICO
predicates. United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984); K. BRICKEY, supra note 243, §§ 7.15, 7.30. Both RICO and CCE have
been described as "compound-complex felonies" which address conduct that is
"multilayered... both as to time and to place involved." See, e.g., Garrett,471 U.S.
at 789; United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990); see United
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1109 (3d Cir. 1990). RICO has been described
as a "super-conspiracy" statute. Comment, The RICO Enterpriseas Distinctfrom the
PatternofRacketeeringActivity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV.'1419,
1443 (1988).
272. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 795 (1985) ("Congress intended
separate punishments for the underlying substantive predicates and for" CCE.). See,
e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1618 (1987) (RICO offense distinct from its predicates). CCE predicates are drug
offenses. See United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1985); supra note
269; infra note 284.
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cannot, however, be imposed for a predicate conspiracy offense and CCE
because doing this would punish the same conduct twice.273
Though both target concerted criminal activity, CCE is more stringent
than RICO in this regard. An individual acting alone can violate RICO, but
not CCE. 274 If the objection given above as to why Pinkerton liability is
inappropriate under RICO is well-taken, such liability would be equally
inappropriate under CCE because it, too, is a "compound" offense that
punishes crimes, "the commission of which was agreed to by the defendant." 275

273. "[A] defendant convicted under § 848 may not also be convicted for any
predicate conspiracy charges proved as elements of the CCE offense." United States
v. Lyles, 929 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1991). Accord United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d
739 (6th Cir. 1991) ("defendant cannot be subjected to cumulative punishment for both
a conspiracy violation under [21 U.S.C. §] 846 and a CCE violation"); see also United
States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159-60 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2810 (1991); United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021
(1986). Section 846 of title 21 of the United States Code makes it an offense to
conspire to commit certain drug offenses. If it were used as a CCE predicate and
punishment were to be imposed for both offenses, the defendant would be punished
twice for a single act of agreeing to commit drug offenses. See, e.g., Jeffers, 432 U.S.
at 150-54. But see infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (using lesser conspiracy
charge and Pinkerton to establish CCE offense).
One can be convicted of RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to commit drug
offenses without offending the rule against double jeopardy. See, e.g., United States
v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988)
(different offenses). One can also be convicted of both RICO and CCE without
violating this prohibition. See, e.g., United States v. Muhammad, 824 F.2d 214, 218
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013 (1988) (CCE "targets supervisors of
narcotics enterprises; RICO is aimed at all those who, through an enterprise, participate
in acts of racketeering activity, whether those acts be narcotics offenses or other
specified crimes".).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 270-71 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986) (single
individual RICO offense); see also Tarlow, supra note 210, at 344-45; supra note 269
and accompanying text.
275. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 504-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 939 (1986). See supra note 266; see also Garrett,471 U.S. at 789 (RICO
and CCE as "compound-complex felonies"). The objection to Pinkerton liability may
be even stronger for CCE than for RICO, since one court has held that complicity, in
the form of aiding and abetting liability, does not apply to CCE. Accord United States
v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 579 (1990);
Benevento, 836 F.2d 60 at 71-72; United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381-82 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988) (participants in drug offenses cannot
be convicted of CCE as aiders and abettors of that offense; cf. United States v.
Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260 (1988) (aiding and
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But Pinkerton liability applies to CCE: In United States v. Graewe,
charge, and one convicted of78
the Sixth Circuit held that CCE "is a conspiracy
"
v. Michel
a CCE is subject to Pinkerton liability. 27 In United States

the Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that Pinkerton applies because a CCE offense
279
No
implicates the agreement that gives rise to Pinkerton liability.
reported cases hold to the contrary.
This plus the application of aiding and abetting liability suggests that the
question posed above should be answered in the negative, that, in other words,
there is no principled reason why Pinkerton liability cannot be used in RICO
prosecutions. Because RICO and CCE are different statutes, however,
Pinkerton's application under CCE cannot conclusively establish its acceptability under RICO. To do this, it is necessary to analyze RICO's peculiar

abetting liability applies to CCE). But see United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 264
(2d Cir. 1988) (supervisor's CCE liability based upon aiding and abetting CCE
predicates).
276. 774 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1985).
277. Id. at 106-08 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986,
999 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979)); United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d
518, 524-25 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1986); United States v.
Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
Accord United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068
(1985). In the usual Pinkerton scenario, an accused's involvement in a conspiracy
suffices to hold her liable for substantive offenses committed in furtherance of that
conspiracy. See, e.g., Michel, 588 F.2d at 999. But in Jones, 763 F.2d at 524-26, the
Second Circuit held that Pinkerton liability could establish the predicates needed for
a CCE conviction. See also Jones v. United States, No. 90 Civ. 2625, (S.D.N.Y. Sep.
13, 1990) (LEXIS, Dist. Library). For a discussion of this use of Pinkerton see infra
section III(A)(2) of this Article, pp. 993-96.
278. 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1980).
279. Id. at 999. The court noted that Pinkerton applies to other drug offenses and
should, therefore, be used to hold
the organizer or supervisor of a criminal enterprise responsible for the acts
of his co-conspirators done in furtherance of the operation he manages....
Pinkerton ...is based upon an agreement .... This element is also
present in ...a continuing criminal enterprise .... The statute requires

that a defendant must act "in concert" with five or more persons. The
Supreme Court ...[has] interpreted this to encompass the agreement
required to prove a conspiracy.... Therefore, we hold Pinkerton ...

applicable to defendants charged with ... a § 848 continuing criminal
enterprise.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Jones, 763 F.2d at 525 ("jury properly using
substantive Pinkerton counts as predicate violations, convicted Jones of operating a
continuing criminal enterprise").
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structure to determine if it presents an obstacle to Pinkerton liability that does
not exist under CCE.
One possibility in this regard is the conduct each addresses. Though both
target organized criminal activity, CCE is limited to drug offenses while RICO

sweeps much more broadly.2*0 From this and from contemporary attitudes
toward drug trafficking, one can argue that Pinkerton liability is appropriate
under CCE because it provides an additional weapon against a particularly
heinous evil, but is inappropriate under RICO because RICO can be used in
so many different circumstances against such a variety of defendants. 1
This argument, however, fails. Aside from projecting current law enforcement
priorities onto statutes that are the products of a very different climate, 282 it
ignores RICO's use in drug cases."
Another possibility lies in the structure of their respective prohibitions.
Each addresses concerted criminal activity occurring in an organizational
setting.'
CCE attacks "managers" of drug enterprises; RICO attacks those
who combine to use racketeering to have a defined impact upon an enterprise,
which can be legitimate or illegitimate in nature. 5 CCE makes commission
of substantive violations an element of its offense; RICO conspiracy penalizes
the act of agreeing to commit substantive violations. 28 This suggests that

280. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 979-85.
281. Here, one can also invoke RICO's use against white-collar defendants to
argue that Pinkerton liability is especially inappropriate in this context. For critiques
of RICO's use against white-collar crimes, see supra note 210.
282. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 979-81; see also supra notes 26769 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 209, at 654 & n.23 ("There have been scores
of successful RICO prosecutions of narcotics rings, including major South American
traffickers such as Carlos Lehder .... ." (citing United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 669 F.
Supp. 1563 (M.D. Fla. 1987))); cf. Coffey, supra note 209, at 1036-42. (Justice
Department "ordinarily discourages RICO prosecutions where the pattern of crimes
consists entirely of narcotics trafficking ... [as] these activities are already addressed
by less complicated federal statutes," such as CCE.).
284. See supra notes 251 & 271 and accompanying text. While CCE has been
interpreted as creating a conspiracy offense, RICO explicitly does so. See supra note
270 and accompanying text; supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 980-85.
285. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 980-85; see also supra notes 26873 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2810 (1991).
There are five elements in a continuing criminal enterprise offense: (1) a
felony violation of the federal narcotics law; (2) as part of a continuing
series of violations; (3) in concert with five or more persons; (4) for whom
the defendant is an organizer or supervisor; and (5) from which he derives
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Pinkerton liability is more appropriate for CCE than for RICO because CCE
includes a heightened level of criminal involvement as a prerequisite for the
committed a
imposition of Pinkerton liability, in that one must have
7
substantive offense to be convicted of a CCE "conspiracy."M

This erroneously assumes that a CCE/RICO conviction is needed for
Pinkerton liability. No reported RICO cases apply Pinkerton, but under CCE
it is submitted to the jury as a separate issue; to impose liability for substantive offenses, they must find that a defendant joined a conspiracy and that the
In other
offenses were committed in furtherance of that conspiracy.'

substantial income.
Id. at 156. For RICO's conspiracy provisions, see supra section II(C) of this Article,
pp. 983-85.
287. This statement assumes that Pinkerton liability is used under CCE as it has
traditionally been used-to impute liability for substantive offenses committed in
furtherance of a conspiracy. For a discussion of its use to establish the elements of
a CCE charge, see supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
The aspect of a CCE offense noted above can also be used to argue that
Pinkerton liability is less appropriate in this context because a CCE offense already
incorporates at least an element of substantive liability. Though logically appealing,
this argument ignores legislative history which indicates that CCE was intended as a
cumulative punishment device, one aspect of which permits the imposition of penal
sanctions both for the CCE offense itself and for the substantive offenses that are its
components. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 793-95 (1985); J effers
v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 149-50 n.14 (1977) ("Congress was concerned with
providing severe penalties for professional criminals when it included the continuingcriminal-enterprise section in the statute.").
288. In United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
825 (1979), the Fifth Circuit described this inquiry as whether the government's
evidence would allow a jury to find
that an agreement or common purpose to violate the Drug Control Act
existed. If this concert of action has been proved, all members of the
enterprise, including the organizer, manager, or supervisor, are responsible
for the substantive offenses committed by each member during the course
of and in furtherance of the plan.
Id. at 999. Accord United States v. Graewe, 774 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986) ("In finding Lonardo guilty of the CCE and the
substantive offenses the jury ...found that a conspiracy existed, that Angelo Lonardo
was a member ...and that the substantive offenses were committed in furtherance of
...[it]"); see also supra notes 267, 276; United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1520
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986) ("Since copious evidence against the
other co-conspirators ... shows their involvement in the CCE and . .. substantive
offenses, the evidence only need show that Lonardo was also a member of the CCE
conspiracy.").
For one case that used Pinkerton with a RICO conspiracy, see United States v.
Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990). Pinkerton was also used in another case that
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words, they apply the general Pinkerton standard.2s 9 The heightened
involvement postulated above is irrelevant because the imposition of Pinkerton
liability in CCE cases conforms to the requirements for imposing liability
under "traditional conspiracy law." Because heightened involvement is not a
consideration in using Pinkerton under CCE and because RICO's conspiracy
provision retains "traditional conspiracy law,"29° the structural differences
between CCE and RICO offenses do not indicate any reason why Pinkerton
liability cannot attach under the latter.
The final objection that can be postulated to using Pinkerton liability
under RICO implicates issues of punishment-the potential for "compound"
punishment and the difficulty of segregating "major" and "minor" offenders.
Apportioning fault among offenders is a factual problem, and so is considered
in section III(A)(2), below. The problem of inflicting "compound" punishment
for a single course of conduct was noted earlier. 29'
The objection here is that Pinkerton liability becomes an unnecessary
redundancy under statutes such as RICO because they already include
"enhanced penalties based, at least in part, on involvement in the predicate
crimes defining the conspiracy." 292 This presumably refers to the harsher

included RICO charges, though it was apparently not used in conjunction with those
charges. See United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991). In McClain,
Pinkerton was used to attribute liability for attempted extortion. See id. at 824. But
in discussing a Pinkerton instruction, the prosecutor seems to have at least intimated
that it might apply to the RICO charges.
At first the instruction was discussed by counsel and the district judge as
if it were offered to facilitate the codefendants' conviction for the RICO
conspiracy violation.... When pressed by defense counsel as to whether
combining a Pinkerton instruction with a RICO conspiracy charge would
be permissible, the government apparently altered its strategy, claiming
alternatively that the instruction was proper to allow the jury to convict
Morgan Finley of the substantive acts of his alleged coconspirator ....
Id. at 826 n.3. See also supra note 266.

289. See supra section II(B) of this Article, pp. 948-52; see also supra note 119
(general Pinkerton instruction).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1990)
("A section 1962(d) conspiracy is not a new generic category of conspiracy but a

specific goal of traditionalconspiracy law"); accord United States v. Neapolitan, 791
F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 940 (1986); United States v.
Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Norris v. United States,
469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1192 n.7 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
291. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
292. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 504-05. If this objection were valid, Pinkerton
liability should not apply under CCE. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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sentences that apply to RICO conspiracy versus those that apply under the
general federal conspiracy statute.293 Even assuming, arguendo, that the
sanction for RICO conspiracy presupposes a level of involvement in predicate
offenses,2' this is not an obstacle to using Pinkerton. Cumulative punishments can be imposed for a RICO conspiracy and substantive offenses,295
so the penalty for the former cannot have been intended to supersede liability,
and punishment, for substantive offenses. If RICO substance and conspiracy
can be punished additively, there is no reason why Pinkerton liability cannot
enter into a RICO
be used to accomplish this end by holding those who 296
conspiracy to the consequences of their criminal bargain.

293. For RICO penalties, see supra section 11(C) of this Article, pp. 980-85. See
also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2E1.1 (RICO sentencing),
§ 2T1.9 (tax conspiracy sentencing), § 2X1.1 (general conspiracy sentencing) (1991).
For comments on the general federal conspiracy statute, see supra section I1(B) of this
Article, pp. 966-73.
294. This assumption seems inconsistent with the nature of the RICO conspiracy
offense, as it requires neither the commission of a substantive offense nor an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy for the consummation of the offense. See, e.g.,
Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 489.
Nothing... [in] the statute or its legislative history supports the imposition
of a more stringent level of personal involvement in a conspiracy to violate

RICO as opposed to a conspiracy to violate anything else.... [I]t seems
more likely that Congress... intended section 1962(d) to be broad enough
to encompass those persons who, while intimately involved in the
conspiracy, neither agreed to personally commit nor actually participated in
the commission of the predicate crimes.
Id. at 498. See generally Note, Conspiracyto Violate RICO: Expanding Traditional
ConspiracyLaw, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1983).
295. See supra section I1(C) of this Article, pp. 983-85. United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1115-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Scarfo v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991) ("consecutive sentences for RICO substantive and

conspiracy offenses are permissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause because they
are statutorily authorized"). RICO differs from CCE in that cumulative sentences can
be imposed for RICO conspiracy and for other conspiracy offenses that constitute the
predicates for substantive RICO charges. See id. at 1108 n.24.
296. Arguably, it may be less objectionable to use Pinkerton under other criminal
statutes because the RICO conspiracy provision was clearly intended to allow
cumulative punishments for conspiracy and substantive offenses. See, e.g., United
States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1991) (in

RICO, Congress created an offense different from that defined by the general federal
conspiracy statute "and intended to allow cumulative punishments").
One case holds that imposing joint and several liability in RICO forfeitures does
not offend "traditional concepts of criminal law and individual responsibility." United
States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 917,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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To do otherwise ignores the premise of Pinkerton liability, namely, that
the act of joining a conspiracy can have causal significance. If one joins a
RICO conspiracy and no substantive offenses are committed, punishment for
conspiracy is commensurate with the harm inflicted; but if one joins a RICO
conspiracy and substantive offenses are committed, a greater harm has resulted
and it is reasonable to hold those who "caused" this harm responsible for it.
There is no principled reason to treat those who join a RICO conspiracy that
produces the commission of substantive RICO offenses differently than Daniel
Pinkerton was treated. In both instances, a defendant is held liable for the
harm that proximately resulted from his act of joining with others for criminal
purposes. Also, the "compound punishment" objection ignores Pinkerton'suse
under CCE, the other "compound crime-within-a-crime" statute.297 If
Pinkerton liability can be used under CCE, which clearly bases its enhanced
penalties on involvement in substantive drug offenses, there is no conceptual
reason why it cannot be used under RICO.
2. Application
The obvious source of guidance for deciding how Pinkerton liability can
be used in RICO prosecutions is its application in CCE cases. It has been

used two different ways in such cases.298 One use is conventional-holding
members of a conspiracy liable for crimes committed by their colleagues.
Here, the combination that gives rise to CCE liability also supports imposition
of liability for substantive offenses that were committed as a concomitant of
that concerted activity. 2" In this version, participation in a CCE drug
enterprise replaces the usual conspiracy charge.

483 U.S. 1021 (1987) (citing Pinkerton,328 U.S. at 647). Despite defense arguments
contra, the court held that such liability was permissible under RICO because "RICO
itself by design is not traditional criminal law: it represents a radical departure from
common law notions of liability and punishment in criminal law in a number of
respects." Id. at 1508 (citing United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1986));
United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1345 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984).
297. United States v. Neopolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 939, 940 (1986) (describing RICO).
298. See supra note 277.
299. For the elements of a CCE offense, see supra notes 268-69, 286 and
accompanying text. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,444
U.S. 825 (1979), illustrates this approach. Robert Belmares was convicted, inter alia,
of CCE and two substantive counts of importing marijuana. Id. at 1000. He
contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt on these substantive
counts, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on the Pinkerton doctrine. Id. at 999
("Belmares, as supervisor, shares equal responsibility for those offenses").
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The other version uses Pinkerton to establish a CCE offense. In this
approach, the doctrine is employed to attribute liability for substantive
offenses to someone who is charged with CCE; the attribution of liability for
these offenses establishes the requisites for CCE liability, i.e., that the accused
committed a substantive violation as part of a series of violations committed
in concert with five or more other persons.3 00 This is almost a "reverse
Pinkerton" doctrine in that it uses a lesser conspiracy offense to attribute
Pinkerton liability for substantive offenses, which are CCE predicates, and
uses those predicates to establish liability for CCE, a "greater" conspiracy
offense.3 °'
As explained below, it is difficult to transpose this "reverse Pinkerton"
doctrine to RICO, but applying the traditional doctrine is relatively unproblematic. Under the latter, a finding that a defendant joined a RICO conspiracy
would support the imposition of liability for substantive RICO offenses
committed in the course of that conspiracy. 3'
The imposition of such

300. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. This approach was used in
United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985)
("jury properly using substantive Pinkerton counts as predicate violations, convicted
Jones of operating a continuing criminal enterprise"). Jones was charged with drug

conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988), which is a lesser-included offense of CCE,
substantive drug violations and CCE. Id. at 526. Because Jones had not personally
committed the substantive offenses, the prosecution used the drug conspiracy charge
to impute liability for those offenses under Pinkerton and, having done so, argued that
they should be used as predicates to establish Jones' CCE liability. See id. at 524-26.
The trial court felt it was improper to use Pinkerton in this manner, so it set aside the
CCE conviction. Id. at 524 (incorrect to use "substantive narcotics violations that
Jones himself did not commit, but of which he was guilty because of" involvement in
a conspiracy" as predicates). The Second Circuit held that this was error and
reinstated the conviction. See id. at 525 (court "incorrectly instructed the jury not to
consider... predicate violations on a Pinkerton theory"); see also Jones v. United
States, No. 88 Civ. 3999, (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database)
(Jones' liability on the "substantive offenses was predicated on the acts of his
co-conspirators and, as such, were Pinkerton offenses").
301. For the distinction between "lesser" conspiracies and CCE, see supra notes
270-73 and accompanying text. While one can be convicted of CCE and a lesser
conspiracy, punishment cannot be, imposed for both. See supra note 273 and
accompanying text. But because CCE and its substantive predicates are different
offenses, they can be punished separately. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
302. A RICO conspiracy requires two agreements which, in the case of a
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), would include "an agreement to
conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise and an agreement to the
commission of at least two predicate acts." United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489,
503 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986). A party must agree to both. One
who affiliated with a RICO enterprise but did not agree to the commission of a pattern
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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liability can, however, implicate the problem noted above, of apportioning
liability among "major" and "minor" players in a RICO scenario. 3 This
problem varies in the extent to which it applies to particular cases, as is
demonstrated by two hypotheticals.
First, assume that A, B, C, D, E, F, and G conspire to conduct the affairs
of a legitimate corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;
the object of the agreement is to engage in conduct that constitutes a
substantive RICO violation under section 1962(c). 304 Assume that A is the
head of the corporation and that his role is the relatively passive one of
agreeing to allow B, C, D, E, F, and G to exploit the enterprise without his
interference. Though he does not personally engage in racketeering activity,
he is fully apprised of their conduct and acquiesces in it. Further assume that
they would be unable to gain and maintain access to the enterprise but for A's
acquiescence and non-interference. Assume, finally, that B, C, D, E, F, and
G take advantage of the opportunity provided by their agreement with A to
engage in various acts that collectively qualify as a "pattern of racketeering
3 05
activity.
The operation is discovered and prosecutors prepare to bring charges
against the perpetrators. B, C, D, E, F, and G can clearly be charged with
conspiracy under section 1962(d) and with a substantive violation under
section 1962(c). 3' 6 Absent the Pinkerton doctrine, A can be charged only
with RICO conspiracy because he did not personally engage in racketeering
activity. Using the Pinkerton doctrine, he can be charged with RICO
conspiracy and can also be held liable for the substantive offenses perpetrated

of racketeering activity is not a RICO conspirator, nor is one who agrees to the
commission of two criminal acts but does not consent to the involvement of an
enterprise.
It is possible that the Pinkerton doctrine can be used to impose liability for the
offenses that are the predicates of RICO substantive offenses in addition to attributing
liability for the RICO substantive offenses, at least when the predicate offenses are
federal crimes. Liability can be imposed for RICO predicates absent Pinkerton, so
there seems no reason why it could not be imposed by using the doctrine. See supra
section II(C) of this Article, pp. 983-85. This issue is, however, outside the scope of
this discussion and so is not considered in the text above.
303. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
304. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 983-85.
305. See id.
306. Depending on the details of their activities, it may also be possible to charge
them with additional substantive counts.
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by his colleagues in crime."0
Here, the imposition of Pinkerton liability
clearly accords with Congress' purpose in enacting RICO."°
Now, assume a very different RICO scenario: K, L, M, N, 0, P, Q, R,
S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z have confederated for the purpose of engaging in
various illegal, highly-profitable activities; they jointly constitute an illegitimate, "association in fact" RICO enterprise09 They have a structure and
a division of labor. M, N, and 0 run an illegal gambling operation, while P,
Q, R, S, and T import and sell illegal drugs; W and X are "loan sharks." U
and V are the group's "enforcers"; they use violence as necessary to deal with
competition or internal strife; they have committed three murders and two
attempted murders in the past two years. K, Y, and Z are the "administrators"; they direct and coordinate the activities of the others and handle the
finances.
0 recently joined the gambling operation, where he is "low man on the
totem pole." M and N have more authority over this activity than he does,
and both coordinate the gambling operation with K, Y, and Z. 0 was hired
by M and N and has had no contact with anyone else, although he knows
about K, Y, and Z and their role in the enterprise; he also knows of the other
activities in which it engages and of the other participants in it.
Assume the government has recently concluded an investigation of this
operation and is preparing to bring charges against its participants. 0 can be
charged with RICO conspiracy, as he agreed that acts constituting a pattern
of racketeering activity would be committed to have a specific impact upon
an enterprise.310 Clearly, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z
can be charged with RICO conspiracy and with one or more RICO substantive

307. The mechanics of imposing Pinkertonliability are explained at section II(B)
of this Article, pp. 948-52.
308. "Congress... intended section 1962(d) to be broad enough to encompass
those persons who, while intimately involved in the conspiracy, neither agreed to
personally commit nor actually participated in the commission of the predicate crimes."
United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 503 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940
(1986). This result is also consistent with the directive that RICO be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947. See also Blakey, The RICO Civil
FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
237, 287-88 (1982).
309. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 981-82. This scenario is loosely
based on the facts in United States v. Pungitore, 920 F.2d 1084, 1097-1102 (3d Cir.
1990), cert. denied sub nom. Scarfo v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991). All the
activities attributed to the enterprise are predicate offenses under RICO. See supra
section 1(C) of this Article, pp. 982-85.
310. See infra note 311.
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offenses. 31' Assume, for the purposes of discussion, that these defendants
are charged with RICO conspiracy
and with substantive violations under
312
section 1962(a), (b) and (c).

This configuration raises a difficult issue as to the scope of O's liability.
Given his involvement in the RICO conspiracy, to what extent, if any, should
the Pinkerton doctrine be used to hold him liable for substantive RICO
offenses committed by his co-conspirators?313 Assume that his association
with the enterprise was of such recent origin and so de minimis in nature that
it will not permit the imposition of substantive liability absent the use of
Pinkerton liability. This brings the "compound punishment" objection noted
above sharply into focus. Is it reasonable to hold 0 to the rather horrific
consequence of his criminal bargain? Or should Pinkerton's application be
limited in cases such as this, in which it can result in the infliction of liability,
and punishment, that at least initially seem 31
egregiously
disproportionate to the
4
"harm" inflicted by a particular "bad act"?
Supporters of the latter view would contend that the sanction for RICO
conspiracy already reflects the magnitude of the "harm" resulting from O's act
of associating himself with this enterprise. The sanction for RICO conspiracy
is more severe than the sanctions for conspiring to violate other provisions of
federal law, so one can argue that this should be the only sanction imposed

311. As to the conspiracy, while K, I, M, N, 0, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y
and Z may not have specifically agreed with each other that they would engage in
activity violating RICO, each clearly agreed to associate with the others to commit acts
that constituted a pattern of racketeering activity and that had an impact on the
enterprise that is cognizable under one or more of RICO's substantive provisions. See
supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 980-85. As to the substantive charges,
depending on the length of time in which the enterprise has operated and on certain
other facts, it might be possible to charge substantive violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
312. For the criteria used to decide if multiple substantive RICO counts can be
brought in connection with the operation of a single enterprise, see United States v.
Dean, 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982). See also 1
K. BRIcKEY, supra note 243, § 7.12.

313. As noted above, there is also an issue as to whether the doctrine could be
used to hold 0 liable for the offenses that constitute the predicates for substantive
RICO offenses. See supra note 311. If Pinkerton is utilized in a fashion comparable
to the felony-murder doctrine, it would seem reasonable to hold 0 liable for
substantive predicate offenses that were committed after he joined the RICO
conspiracy.
314. One possibility would be to develop an intermediate form of Pinkerton
liability that differentiates between those whose participation was limited to joining a
conspiracy and those who took a more active role in a criminal enterprise. See supra
note 190.
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unless a defendant has committed or participated in the commission of a harm
transcending mere association for criminal purposes. On the facts above, this
argument would support limiting O's liability to RICO conspiracy absent an
indication that he engaged in conduct which would itself support liability
under one or more substantive RICO provisions.
Though reasonable, this argument ignores at least two factors. One is the
general premise of conspiracy law-the "special dangers" of criminal
associations. Here, the perpetrators have been able to inflict a far greater level
of harm on society because of their association than any could have acting
alone or in smaller groups. Because RICO was intended to provide heightened sanctions against this very evil, imposing Pinkerton liability in this
context may not be as impermissible as some have suggested.
The second factor is the Pinkerton doctrine's rationale.1 Under that
premise, O's act of affiliating with the perpetrators becomes a contributing
cause of substantive offenses resulting from their association. Given that he
can be deemed to have "caused" the commission of these offenses, it is no
more unreasonable to use Pinkerton to hold 0 liable for them than it was to
hold Daniel Pinkerton liable for offenses Walter perpetrated,
or than it would
3 16
rationale.
abetting
and
aiding
an
under
liable
0
hold
to
be
The "compound punishment" objection is, therefore, not a valid reason
to except RICO from the compass of Pinkerton liability.311 The Pinkerton

315. See supra section 1I(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 962-978.
316. The discussion implicitly assumes that O's conduct would not sustain
liability as an aider and abettor of the substantive RICO offenses although, as noted
earlier, such liability is imposed under RICO. See supra note 263 and accompanying
text.
CCE practice cannot be used as a guide on these facts. If the enterprise outlined
above limited its activities to drug trafficking, Pinkerton liability could be used under
CCE to hold 0 liable for substantive drug offenses committed by his colleagues. See
United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825
(1979) (all who agree to "violate the Drug Control Act" are "responsible for the
substantive offenses committed by each member during the course of and in
furtherance of the plan"). But he would not be subjected to "compound punishment"
under CCE unless he had acted as a supervisor or manager of the operation. See supra
notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
317. One can argue that it is the compound nature of substantive RICO offenses
that makes the imposition of Pinkerton liability permissible in this context. This
argument can be illustrated by using an example offered to show the problems
involved in applying Pinkerton to organized crime "families." This example is taken
from Coffey, supra note 209, at 1046 n.52.
"Families" are often divided into "crews," each of which has its own "turf," is at
least generally aware of what other crews are doing and "presumably endorses" those
activities as consistent with "the overall objectives" of the family. Id. This division
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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doctrine can be used as it is used in other contexts, to hold members of RICO
conspiracies liable for substantive RICO offenses committed by their coconspirators in furtherance of the goals of such a conspiracy. It does not

of labor can give rise to Pinkerton objections:
Is a member of Crew A, which specializes in narcotics, liable ... for a
hijacking committed by Crew D, a. . . crime of which Crew A members
were completely unaware? Suppose the chief of Crew A, which is located
in New York City, retires to Florida but ... keeps in touch with his
comrades. If Crew C kills a suspected informant ... who could have
testified ... against the "family," is the relocated chief of Crew A...
liable for homicide because the retaliation against witnesses is standard
operating procedure in La Cosa Nostra?
Id. This example assumes Pinkerton is used to impose liability for non-RICO
offenses, such as homicide. The attenuated nature of the association between Crew A,
Crew C and the former chief of Crew A can give rise to reservations about using
Pinkerton to attribute this type of liability on these facts because the "mediate
causation" rationale becomes increasingly problematic as criminal affiliations are
diluted. See supra section II(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 975-78. These reservations are
far less compelling, however, if this scenario is analyzed as an enterprise under
Turkette. Here, all the crew members belong to a RICO conspiracy, at least one
purpose of which is to conduct the affairs of this enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity consisting of the predicate offenses given above. This purpose
is a violation of § 1962(c) and can be punished as such. Assume the former head of
Crew A has done nothing to further this purpose except remain a member of the RICO
conspiracy-is it unreasonable to hold him liable, under Pinkerton,for the substantive
RICO offense perpetrated by his colleagues? Arguably, it is not, because the
commission of this offense was obviously a foreseeable consequence of his association
with the others. Holding him liable for the substantive RICO offense sanctions him
for the "harm" mediately caused by his criminal association. Because the substantive
RICO offense will be predicated on the discrete acts set forth above, it will inflict a
"compound" sanction for their commission without subjecting the former crew chief

to liability for every criminal act perpetrated by his associates.
Recently, in United States v. Edwards, No. 89-2880 (7th Cir., Oct. 15, 1991)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database), the Seventh Circuit addressed the extent to which the
liability imposed under a Pinkerton theory can be applied to complex conspiracies:
"We are faced in this case with the conundrum of applying the concept of reasonable
foreseeability to a drug conspiracy that spanned approximately three years and that
included numerous suppliers-wholesalers, middle-managers, and seller-retailers." Slip
Op. at 6.
Although Edwards involved the attribution of responsibility among coconspirators under the federal sentencing guidelines rather than for purposes of
conviction, the court found that Pinkerton'sprinciples of liability were applicable. Slip
Op. at 5 (standards embodied in sentencing guidelines "roughly approximate" those of
Pinkerton).
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seem, however, that the "reverse Pinkerton" doctrine used under CCE can
apply to RICO.
The reason lies in certain differences between CCE and RICO. CCE's
"reverse Pinkerton" doctrine uses involvement in a predicate conspiracy

offense to impute liability for substantive violations which, in turn, become
the predicates of a CCE charge. While lesser conspiracy offenses are RICO
predicates, it would not be possible to use such an offense in conjunction with
Pinkerton liability to achieve a comparable result. Unlike CCE, RICO
conspiracy requires an agreement to commit one or more substantive RICO
violations in the context of an enterprise. i Unless such an agreement can
be shown to have existed, there is no basis for imputing liability for
substantive RICO violations under Pinkerton; all that can be done with a
lesser conspiracy charge is to use it to attribute liability for specific predicate
offenses.
As an example, consider this variation on the K-Z hypothetical given
above3 19 The facts are the same except that J conspired with M, N, and 0
in the conduct of their illegal gambling operation. The prosecutor attempts to
use the "reverse Pinkerton"doctrine to hold all four liable for RICO offenses.
He charges M, N, and 0 with (a) conspiracy to conduct a gambling operation
in violation of federal law; (b) ten substantive counts of conducting a
gambling operation in violation of federal law; (c) RICO conspiracy; and (d)
a section 1962(c) substantive offense. He charges that J conspired with M, N,
and 0 to conduct a gambling operation in violation of federal law and uses
this charge plus Pinkerton liability to hold J liable for the substantive
gambling offenses. But he cannot use this liability to leverage a RICO
conspiracy or substantive offense. Absent evidence that J's agreement met the
requirements for RICO conspiracy or that his conduct independently satisfied
the requirements for a section 1962(c) violation, his liability is limited to the
predicate conspiracy and substantive offenses. As opposed to CCE, RICO
conspiracy requires a specific agreement to violate RICO; absent such an
agreement, an offender has not joined a RICO conspiracy and cannot,
therefore, be found liable under any RICO provision, Pinkerton notwithstanding.
Pinkerton can, therefore, be used to impose substantive RICO liability in
prosecutions under that statute if it can be shown that a defendant entered into
the agreement necessary for a RICO conspiracy. 2 It can be used under

318. See supra note 302. CCE does not require a specific agreement to engage
in concerted action. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
320. An argument can be made for recognizing a form of Pinkerton liability
predicated upon certain substantive RICO violations. An earlier section explained that
Pinkerton and complicitous liability attribute criminal liability based upon the act of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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RICO precisely as it is used under other federal criminal statutes. It cannot,
however, be used to attribute liability for RICO conspiracy in the absence of
such an agreement.
B. Civil RICO

As the intricacies of civil RICO are beyond the scope of this Article, the
present section is a very cursory treatment of the use of Pinkerton liability in
this area. It is clearly a permissible use. The prior section demonstrated that
there are no conceptual impediments to employing Pinkerton in criminal cases,
and no other objections arise regarding its use in civil RICO cases?21
Indeed, this is a hospitable milieu
for the doctrine, as co-conspirator liability
3"
is well-established in civil law.

affiliating with others for criminal purposes. See supra section 113)(2) of this Article,
pp. 975-78. At least some of the conduct involved in substantive RICO violations can
be characterized as an act of criminal affiliation; perhaps the best example is an
"association in fact" enterprise that exists for purely illegal purposes. See supranotes
222-23 and accompanying text. Arguably, associating oneself with such an enterprise
is an act akin to the acts that respectively support liability under Pinkerton (conspiracy)
or complicity (aiding and abetting). Assuming that there are instances in which such
an act could occur without the additional aspect of an agreement that would support
Pinkerton liability, it can be argued that this act should support some form of
affiliative liability. See suprasection 1I(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 975-78. On the other
hand, it can also be argued that the such liability is not necessary given the weapons
that already exist for use in this context. And it can also be argued that such an
extension of affiliative liability comes perilously close to instituting guilt by
association. See id.
321. Because the criminal doctrine of complicity clearly applies to civil RICO
cases, there is no reason why the kindred Pinkerton doctrine cannot also apply. For
aiding and abetting liability, see, e.g., Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d Cir.
1990) (aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co.,
824 F.2d 1349, 1356-58 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Morrow v. Black, 742 F. Supp. 1199,
1203-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (allegation of aiding and abetting RICO predicates stated
claim for RICO conspiracy); Feltman v. Prudential Bache Secs., 122 Bankr. 466, 469;
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (claim for aiding and abetting § 1962(c) violation); see also
Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liabilityfor Civil Violations ofRICO, 61 TEMPLE L.

REV. 1481 (1988).
322. See generally supra section II(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 961-62 (vicarious
liability in civil cases). Pinkerton is used under other federal statutes. As an example,
Moses v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 908 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1990), was a civil rights
case brought by a black correctional officer who believed he was the target of a whitesupremacist conspiracy. His action included a claim against a hospital that employed
two nurses whom he accused of filing false reports of misconduct against him. Id.
The hospital argued for dismissal of the claim, but the Seventh Circuit used Pinkerton
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This discussion, therefore, assumes Pinkerton can be used in civil RICO
litigation. It summarizes the few reported cases that address this issue23
and notes an advantage that can be realized from employing Pinkerton in civil
RICO actions.
1. Cases
The reported cases include several attempts at using Pinkerton in civil
RICO, though there are more failures than successes. In one of the failures,
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 324 the plaintiffs sued antiabortion protestors. They asserted RICO conspiracy and substantive claims
against all defendants, and then tried to use their conspiracy allegations plus
Pinkertonliability to withstand one defendant's motion for summary judgment
of their section 1962(c) claim against her.32s The court held, however, that

to disagree:
Moses ... alleges that the hospital was part of a conspiracy to interfere
with his civil rights.... [E]very conspirator is responsible for every
foreseeable act in furtherance of the conspiracy, Pinkerton v. UnitedStates,
328 U.S. 640 (1946), and if the hospital is part of the conspiracy it is
vicariously responsible for the acts which did cause harm.
Id. It is clear that co-conspirator liability attaches in actions for civil conspiracy. See,
e.g, United States Industries v. Touche Ross Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1237-38 (10th Cir.
1988) (conspirators jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from the
conspiracy); accord Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1986); Beltz Travel Serv.
v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 620 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1980); Ferguson v.
Omnimedia, Inc., 469 F.2d 194, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1972); Durant Software v. Herman,
209 Cal. App. 3d 229, 257 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1989); Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146
(Del. 1987); Laventhol, Krekstein, & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168 (Del. 1976);
Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mercer v. Woodard,
166 Ga. App. 119, 303 S.E. 2d 475 (1983); Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (liability of persons acting in
concert).
323. Not discussed below is American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing
Enter., 755 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1990), which used co-conspirator liability as a
basis for finding venue in civil RICO actions. See id. at 1304 n.19 ("any co-conspirator's act in a district is attributable to the other co-conspirators").
324. No. C86-1617 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
325. Id. Bonnie Undseth argued that there was no evidence she had committed
two predicate offenses, the minimum needed to show the pattern of racketeering
activity required for a section 1962(c) violation. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs argued that as a
member of a RICO conspiracy, she was liable under Pinkerton for predicate acts
committed by other members of the conspiracy. Id. at 3. This was an attempt to
establish the predicate acts needed for a § 1962(c)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2 claim by using Pinkerton to
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they had not alleged her involvement in the conspiracy with the specificity
required in federal civil pleading, so their conspiracy claim failed."2 This
meant that the attempt to use Pinkerton to sustain their section 1962(c) claim
failed, also. 327 The most interesting aspect of this decision is dicta in which
the court apparently rejects use of the "reverse Pinkerton" doctrine in civil
RICO cases.3 '
A more conventional attempt to use Pinkerton failed in Laterza v.
American Broadcasting Co.329 Plaintiffs' RICO claims arose from an

alleged pattern of racketeering involving door-to-door magazine subscription
sales. 330 The magazine publishers named as defendants moved to dismiss,
arguing that plaintiffs had not accused them of participating in "any specific
criminal act. 331 Plaintiffs argued that the publishers were liable because
they contracted with the salesmen who were alleged to have committed RICO
predicate acts. 32 The plaintiffs were apparently attempting to use these
contracts as the premise for imposing Pinkerton liability on the publishers.333
The district court held that the attempt failed because there was no evidence
that the publishers and salesmen were joined in a RICO conspiracy; it held

attribute liability for predicate acts to a defendant who had neither personally
committed them nor personally participated in their commission. See id. at 3-4. This
is analogous to the use of the "reverse Pinkerton"doctrine discussed in the previous
section. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
326. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which applies to civil RICO claims,
requires that "circumstances constituting fraud" be "stated with particularity." FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b). This is a common problem in civil RICO pleading. See, e.g., J. RAKOFF
& H. GoLDsTEN, supra note 221, § 7.06[1].
327. See J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, § 7.06[1] (no cases used
Pinkerton under § 1962(c) to hold defendant liable for predicate acts of a co-conspirator, "even if he did not specifically enter into a conspiracy to commit that particular
act").
328. This portion of the opinion indicates that section 1962(c) claims must be
based upon acts personally committed by a defendant, rather than those attributed to
a defendant via the Pinkerton doctrine. See id. (quoting United States v. Persico, 832
F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988)) (§ 1962(c) targets
"individual patterns of racketeering engaged in by a defendant, rather than the
collective activities ... which are proscribed by section 1962(d).").
329. 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
330. Id. at 411-12.
331. Id. at 412.
332. Id.
333. Id. ("attempt to impose liability on the Publisher Defendants as principals by
way of a conspiracy").
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that the existence of contractual relationship was not sufficient to support the
imposition of such liability.334
Another unsuccessful attempt came in Frymire v. Peat,Marwick,Mitchell
& Co.,335 a stockholder suit against an accounting firm for improperly

auditing corporate financial statements. Plaintiffs asserted a claim for RICO
conspiracy, apparently intending to use it to hold the defendant liable for
substantive RICO violations committed by an alleged co-conspirator.3 6
Like the two attempts described above, this effort failed because the court held
that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged the defendant's involvement in
the RICO conspiracy.337
The government successfully used Pinkerton in a civil RICO suit against
a union local. 3 8 The complaint alleged that several individuals "conspired,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), to violate, and actually did violate, 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) and (c)."'339 The action sought injunctive relief barring
these individuals from continuing their involvement with the local.34 ' The
district court awarded judgment for the government on all RICO counts.
It held that because the defendants were members of a RICO conspiracy, each
was liable for substantive RICO violations committed in furtherance of that
conspiracy, even though the violations were perpetrated by other members of

the conspiracy?

2

334. Id. at 413 ("mere fact that defendants contracted together" insufficient).
Pinkerton is never cited in the opinion, but is clearly the basis for the plaintiff's
argument in this regard.
335. 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
336. Id. at 894-95. "Plaintiffs allege.., that [Peat, Marwick] was.., vicariously
liable as a conspirator with Powers." Id. at 895. See also id. ("plaintiffs have asserted
only vicarious liability ...on a theory of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), a
conspiracy to violate RICO").
337. Plaintiffs maintained that the co-conspirator had violated § 1962(a)-(c), but
the court held that the complaint did not indicate "which of those sections [Peat,
Marwick] supposedly agreed to violate, let alone find facts which would support such
an agreement." Id. at 896. The court dismissed the RICO count, but gave leave to
amend. Id.
338. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279
(D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
339. Id. at 283.
340. Id. The suit sought appointment of a receiver and injunctive relief barring
the defendants from "any further contacts with Local 560." Id. For the government's
ability to bring civil RICO actions, see supra section II(C) of this Article, p. 981.
341. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 334-35.
342. Id. at 335 ("culpability under § 1962(c) established by their own acts ...
and, under Pinkerton, by the conduct of their co-conspirators"). See also id.
("culpability... under § 1962(b)... established by their own conduct ...and,under
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2
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This exhausts the reported civil RICO jurisprudence on the Pinkerton
doctrine, but cases that consider use of the doctrine under comparable federal
statutes are collected in the margin."
2. Advantages
Vicarious liability is a matter of great dispute in civil RICO litigaThe controversy is too complex to address here, but centers around
the extent to which employers can be held liable for RICO violations
tion.3

Pinkerton, by the racketeering acts of their coconspirators").
343. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods.

Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), plaintiff tried to use Pinkerton to hold
the members of an alleged conspiracy liable "for Robinson-Patman Act and Clayton
Act § 7 violations committed by one or more of the members of the conspiracy." Id.
at 1176-77. The defendants argued that Pinkerton does not apply to civil cases in
general "and to civil antitrust cases ...in particular." Id. at 1177. Unfortunately, the
trial court refused to reach this issue:
[H]owever it may have been ignored in recent years, and despite its never
having been applied in a civil context, Pinkerton is a Supreme Court
decision which has not been overruled.... [I]t is best that the question of
the applicability of the Pinkerton doctrine in a civil antitrust context await
another case and another day.
Id. at 1178. Cf. Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, 40 F.2d 620,
624 (7th Cir. 1930) (co-conspirator liability under the Clayton Act). Pinkerton'sstatus
under anti-trust laws may not be relevant in determining its role under RICO, as
RICO's drafters made a conscious effort to differentiate it from the anti-trust laws.
See O'Neill, "Motherof Mercy, Is This the Beginning ofRICO?": The ProperPoint
of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 172, 186 (1990)

(Though they modelled RICO on the antitrust laws, the drafters of the Act were careful
to distinguish the two.).
Co-conspirator liability has been applied in actions for securities violations. See,
e.g., In re American Principals Holdings, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. M.D.L. 653, n.10 (S.D.
Cal. July 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (applied to claim for Rule lOb-5
violation).
344. See, e.g., Dwyer & Kiely, Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 324 (1985); Note,
JudicialEfforts to Redirect an ErrantStatute: Civil RICO and the Misapplicationof
Vicarious CorporateLiability, 65 B.C.L. REV. 561 (1985); see also J. RAKOFF & H.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, at § 3.01.
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committed by their employees?4 s Neither the courts nor the commentators
have yet resolved this issueY36
The Pinkerton doctrine is not a rule of vicarious liability so it cannot
resolve the issue?4 7 It is, however, an alternate means of holding employers
liable for substantive RICO violations carried out by their employees; it can
also be used to expand the reach of RICO substantive liability beyond those
who personally commit the requisite racketeering acts. Curiously, it does not
seem to have been used in either fashion, perhaps because of uncertainty as
to whether it can be used in civil litigation.m
The details of Pinkerton's role in civil RICO litigation are beyond the
scope of this Article, 349 but the uses noted above can be illustrated by two
examples. In the employer-employee scenario, assume one entity-GATO,
Inc.-wants to take over another-SUNDO, Inc. GATO officers AA, AB,
AC, AD, and AE employ a pattern of racketeering activity to weaken
SUNDO's financial position so that it cannot resist GATO's take-over efforts.
The GATO officers are clearly chargeable under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(b),

345. RICO plaintiffs often attempt to impose liability "on the employer of the
individual(s) alleged to have violated the statute under ... theories of vicarious
liability, in an effort to reach a corporate, usually deep, pocket." J. RAKOFF & H.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, at 3. See, e.g., D & S Auto Parts v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d
964, 966 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988) ("[V]icarious liability is
inconsistent with this court's approach to direct RICO liability ....

The statute, as

interpreted by this court, imposes liability only upon a corporation that is a perpetrator
of a criminal scheme.") (citing United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.
1985)); Haroco Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
346. See J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 221, at 3-6.

347. See supra section II(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 961-66; see also Minpeco, S.A.
v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 151, 160 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Liability for conspirators, although premised on one's relationship with
other members of the conspiracy, is based on one's own participation in the
conspiracy and a principle of law that a conspirator should be liable for the
acts of her or his confederates who are furthering a common plan. Liability
for the acts of coconspirators is joint and several ....

Vicarious liability

... involves shifting of full responsibility to a blameless party, based on
the party's relationship or policy considerations.
Id.
348. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods.

Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1983).
349. For a more extensive discussion of Pinkerton's use in this context, see
Seeberger, Partnersin Crime: RICO Associations in Factand PinkertonLiability-A
Conspiracy by any other Name or a Conspiracy is a Conspiracy is a Conspiracy,
[forthcoming]
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/2

80

Brenner: Brenner: Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality

1991]

PINKERTON AND RICO

1011

(c) and/or (d)."
The more attractive target for litigants seeking to
redress damage inflicted by the officers' activities is, of course, GATO itself.
If these litigants can show that GATO conspired with its officers regarding the
activity in question, GATO can be held liable for RICO conspiracy. Current
RICO law does not permit it to be held liable for substantive violations absent
evidence that it actively engaged in substantive RICO violations.-" The
advantage Pinkerton liability offers plaintiffs in this situation is that the
officers' conduct can be imputed to their corporate employer if it is shown
that they all joined a RICO conspiracy that produced the substantive
violations. This provides an alternative means for imposing substantive
liability on the employer, one that avoids the need for relying on the
uncertainty of respondeat superior.5

350. See supra section II(C) of this Article, pp. 980-85. That is, they (i)
conspired to violate one of RICO's substantive provisions, and (ii) have committed
such a violation by using their pattern of racketeering activity (a) to acquire an interest
in and/or control of SUNDO, a RICO enterprise; (b) to conduct or participate in the
conduct of its affairs. See id.
351. See, e.g., Dwyer & Kiely, Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer
Influenced And Corrupt OrganizationsAct, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 324, 331 (1985); see
also Note, Judicial Efforts To Redirect An Errant Statute: Civil Rico And The
MisapplicationOf Vicarious Liability, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 561 (1985).
352. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32-33 (1st Cir.
1986) (rejecting vicarious liability under RICO substantive provision); Haroco v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S.
606 (1985) (rejecting respondeat superior and holding that a "corporate enterprise

should be liable where it is the perpetrator, or the central figure in the criminal
scheme"); Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 748 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(corporate defendants could not be held liable under RICO for wrongdoings of
employees on respondeat superior if no facts showed company as active perpetrator of
fraud); United States v. United Skates of America, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 430, 431 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 1989) ("something more than respondeat superior is required before a
corporation will be held liable for the acts of its employees"). Even courts that reject
application of respondeatsuperior hold that corporate enterprises can be held liable
if they were a "perpetrator" of a RICO offense. See D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 966 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988); Haroco,
747 F.2d at 401. Pinkerton offers a means of establishing that a corporate or other
employer was a "perpetrator" of RICO substantive violations even when it took no
affirmative action toward that end. As such, it is a useful supplement to aiding and
abetting liability, which can be used to impose substantive liability when its
requirements are met. See supra section II(A), II(B)(2) of this Article, pp. 932-35,
944-78. Since such liability requires a more active level of participation than
Pinkerton liability, the two are not co-extensive and Pinkerton offers advantages that
do not exist under aiding and abetting.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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To illustrate the operation of the second device noted above, assume
GATO desires to take over SUNDO and conspires with certain SUNDO
officers to that end. The SUNDO officers-BA, BB, BC, BD, and BE-use
a pattern of racketeering activity to weaken SUNDO's financial position so it
cannot resist GATO's advances. Once again, the individuals are liable for
RICO conspiracy and substantive offenses, but GATO is only liable for RICO
conspiracy, as it did not participate in the racketeering activity. If, however,
one applies Pinkerton to this scenario, GATO can be held liable for substantive offenses that proximately resulted from its conspiracy with BA, BB, BC,
BD, and BE. Even if respondeat superior applied to RICO, it would not
permit imputation of such liability 353
to GATO because BA, BB, BC, BD, and
BE were not employed by GATO.
The advantage that the Pinkerton doctrine offers in both situations is that
it provides an alternative device for imposing substantive liability upon a party
who did nothing more than agree to the commission of racketeering acts that
were intended to have a defined impact upon an enterprise. It is clear that this
type of liability exists under RICO's criminal provisions, as RICO was clearly
designed to target "bosses" who set racketeering activity in motion but do not
personally engage in predicate acts. Using Pinkerton allows liability for this
scenario to be transposed to the civil context, where the impetus for
racketeering activity may come from artificial entities that bear little or no
resemblance to the "Godfathers" that prompted RICO's enactment.
One might ask why, if such parties can be held liable for RICO
conspiracy, there is any reason to resort to Pinkerton to impose substantive
liability, as well. There are at least two reasons to do so. One is that
Pinkerton gives civil litigants an opportunity to hold these parties liable for
the harms actually caused by their actions. The other is that it is a means of
reaching "deep pockets" that may not otherwise be available, because several
cases hold that neither indemnification or contribution exist under RICO. 5 4
As several of the cases described above illustrate, the most difficult part
of employing the Pinkerton doctrine in civil RICO litigation is pleading
conspiracy with the specificity required by the Federal Rules of Civil

353. See, e.g., 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 243, at 739-78.
354. See, e.g., 0 & K Trojan, Inc. v. Municipal & Contractors Equip. Corp., 751
F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Department of Economic Dev. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 931-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco, S.A. v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 151, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Jacobson v.
W. Montana Prod. Credit Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 391, 396 (D. Mont. 1986); Seminole
Elec. Coop. v. Tanner, 635 F. Supp. 582, 583-85 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Central Illinois
Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. DuPage County Bank, 622 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99 (N.D.
Ill.
1985).
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Procedure. 55 For civil litigants who can meet this burden, the Pinkerton
doctrine is a useful device for imposing substantive RICO liability on parties
who might otherwise avoid it.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Pinkerton doctrine emerged as this country was about to discover
"organized crime." Serendipitously, it complements many of the measures
subsequently enacted to strike at that phenomenon. Like those measures, it
deals with a criminal act that has assumed increasing significance in the last
few decades as federal law has shifted to a new paradigm of criminal
behavior. In this paradigm, the focus shifts from individually-perpetrated
offenses to offenses that are perpetrated by or in the context of organized
activity.
This paradigm results from the concern with "organized crime." It is still
evolving, but clearly differs from the common law model of criminal behavior
in targeting a distinct act-allying with others to conduct unlawful activities.
The common law recognized the significance of this act in rules of complicity,
but complicity targets a relatively limited range of affiliative behavior. It
focuses on single instances of criminal behavior or, at most, a sporadic
repetition of such behavior. It does not address organized criminal activity.
Conspiracy evolved independently to address another type of criminal
alliance-an explicit agreement encompassing commission of certain,
otherwise-defined offenses. It, however, only sanctions the conduct entailed
in that agreement. The Pinkerton doctrine was crafted to remedy this
deficiency by allowing conspirators to be held liable for specific harms

resulting from their alliance.
RICO was intended to implement the new paradigm by making it a
separate offense to engage in, or to agree to engage in, criminal activity in the
context of an organization. It was designed to discourage such conduct by
imposing new and stringent penalties that can be cumulated to reflect the
seriousness of particular constituent acts. Incorporating Pinkerton liability into
RICO is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute and with the
new paradigm of criminal behavior it embodies.

355. See supra notes 313-20.
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